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I am thankful to my parents André and France as well as my grandmother Claire
for their constant support and encouragement throughout my studies. Lastly, I am




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
CHAPTER
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Endogenous Learning, Persistent Employer Biases, and Dis-
crimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Labor Market Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1 Employer Information and Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2 Hiring Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.3 Hiring Cutoff and the Group B Wage . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.4 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.5 Biased Beliefs and Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.6 Entry, Exit and Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.7 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.8 Outside Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Relationship with Other Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
iii
2.4 Implications for Empirical Work and Policy . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
III. Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Stereotype Forma-
tion and Hiring Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.1 Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3.2 Employers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3.3 Treatment Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.5 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.6.1 Employer Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.6.2 Deviations from Bayesian Updating . . . . . . . . . 44
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
IV. The Emergence of Hiring Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3 Data, Hiring, and Empirical Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3.1 Characterizing Black Hiring Across Managers . . . . 65
4.3.2 Empirical Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.4.1 Interpretation and Alternative Explanations . . . . 74
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86




2.1 Model Simulation without Entry and Exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 Model Simulation with Market Entry and Exit, 25% Exit Differential 28
3.1 Distribution of Employer Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.1 Manager Heterogeneity in the Hiring of Black and White Workers . 78
4.2 Manager Predicted Shares of Black Hiring Based on Hiring Context,
Market Factors, and Manager Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3 Distribution of Manager Fixed Effects for Black Hiring . . . . . . . 80
A.1 Wage Gap and Model Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.2 Model Simulation with Market Entry and Exit, 100% Exit Differen-
tial, Biased Priors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
B.1 Example Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
C.1 Manager Predicted Shares of White Hiring Based on Hiring Context,
Market Factors, and Manager Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
C.2 Distribution of Manager Fixed Effects for White Hiring . . . . . . . 120
C.3 Manager Predicted Shares of Black Hiring Based on Hiring Context,
Market Factors, and Manager Fixed Effects, Restricted to Managers




3.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 Employer Treatment Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 Impact of Previous Gray Hire on Current Hiring and Beliefs, Treat-
ment B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Impact of Hiring Experiences with Gray Workers on Hiring and Final
Beliefs, Treatment B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5 Differential Impact of Hiring Experiences with Gray Workers on Fi-
nal Bias, Treatment B versus C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6 Differential Impact of Hiring Experiences on Total Hiring and Final
Beliefs, Treatments B versus Treatments B1 and B2 . . . . . . . . . 53
3.7 Employer Characteristics, Hiring and Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.8 Departures from Bayesian Updating, Treatment B . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 Summary Statistics and Performance Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Cumulative Impact of Previous Experiences with Black and White
Workers on Current Hiring of Black Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3 Persistence of Previous Experiences with Black and White Workers
on Current Hiring of Black Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
C.1 Hiring Experiences and Worker Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
C.2 Robustness Checks and Heterogeneity Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . 122
C.3 Cumulative Impact of Previous Experiences with Hispanic and White




A. Appendix for Chapter II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
B. Appendix for Chapter III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
C. Appendix for Chapter IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
vii
ABSTRACT
My dissertation proposes and tests a new theory of labor market discrimination based
on employers developing persistent negatively biased beliefs about the productivity
of worker groups through their hiring experiences with these groups.
My first chapter presents a statistical discrimination model in which employers are
initially uncertain about the productivity of groups and endogenously learn about
it through their hiring experiences. An employer’s hiring history determines their
beliefs about group productivity, but also shapes their subsequent incentives to hire
from the group and learn more about their productivity. Positive experiences create
positive biases which correct themselves by leading to more hiring and learning. Ne-
gative experiences create negative biases which decrease hiring and therefore learning,
leading to the persistence of negative biases. Differential hiring and learning across
employers thus generates a negatively-skewed belief distribution about worker group
productivity. Endogenous employer learning disproportionately affects workers from
minority or underrepresented groups if there is less initial information available about
their productivity in the labor market, making employers more reliant on their own
experiences to assess these groups. I show that discrimination in the form of a wage
below these groups’ expected productivity can arise and persist from this initial in-
formation asymmetry even with market competition and without true productivity
differences between groups, prior bias, or prejudice. The model generates analogous
predictions to taste-based discrimination, in a statistical framework with beliefs re-
placing preferences, providing a new way to understand prejudice as the result of
”incorrect” statistical discrimination. The model helps explain the persistence and
viii
pervasiveness of discrimination, also generating new implications for policies like af-
firmative action which can induce employers to hire from specific groups and learn
about their productivity.
My second chapter tests how hiring experiences of employers with worker groups
impact hiring and beliefs about group productivity. I design an experiment where
employers hire a worker from one of two groups each period, with one group framed
as a minority about whose productivity employers are initially given less informa-
tion. Employers are incentivized to hire productive workers, observe their hire’s
productivity after they perform a real-effort task, and then report their beliefs about
group productivity. The results show that negative experiences with the minority
group, captured through the hiring of low productivity workers, lead to negatively-
biased beliefs about the group’s productivity by decreasing subsequent hiring and
learning. In contrast, positive biases which arise from positive experiences are mi-
tigated through increased hiring, leading to a negatively-skewed belief distribution
across employers.
My third chapter joint with Alan Benson at the University of Minnesota uses em-
ployment records of a large retail firm to study how hiring experiences of managers
with worker groups influence their hiring. We study the hiring of black and white
workers, relating current hiring decisions of a manager to measures of their previous
experiences with these groups. We find that negative experiences with previous hires
of a group, measured by a higher fraction quickly being fired or quitting, decrease
subsequent hiring of the group. More positive experiences, measured by a higher
fraction of previous hires achieving long tenure, increase subsequent hiring of the
group. These impacts are substantively larger for black workers, and early negative





After decades of cultural change and anti-discrimination legislation, there remain
substantial labor market outcome differentials across race and gender (Lang and Leh-
mann, 2012; Blau and Kahn, 2017). Models are key to understand the contribution
of discrimination to these differentials. Statistical discrimination arises as a rational
response to productivity differentials across worker groups, such that employers have
correct equilibrium beliefs about group productivity (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973;
Aigner and Cain, 1977, Coate and Loury, 1993; Moro and Norman, 2004; Fang and
Moro, 2011). Taste-based discrimination explains discrimination through exogenous
preferences of employers for groups (Becker, 1957; Black, 1995), creating differences
between average performance and average pay of groups. An alternative explana-
tion is that discrimination arises from incorrect or biased beliefs of employers about
the productivity of groups.1 Then, discrimination does not reflect true group diffe-
rentials, but arises from a lack of information or learning. The distinction between
statistical discrimination with biased beliefs and other theories is critical, because
they can lead to very different predictions regarding how discrimination arises and
can be mitigated.
In this dissertation, I propose a new mechanism, endogenous employer learning,
through which biased employer beliefs can arise and persist in the labor market and
provide supporting evidence across two empirical settings. The fundamental idea is
that if employers enter the labor market with uncertainty about the productivity of
1See Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Reuben et al. (2014), Bordalo et al. (2016), Mobius et
al. (2016), Laouénan and Rathelot (2017), Van Dalen and Henkens (2019), Arnold et al. (2018),
Landsman (2018), Lesner (2018), Bohren et al. (2019a, 2019b), Bordalo et al. (2019), and Sarsons
(2019).
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different worker groups, then they may naturally update their beliefs as their hire
and observe the productivity of individual workers from these groups. Then, hiring
experiences with a group shape employer beliefs about their productivity, but also
subsequent incentives of employers to hire from the group and learn more about their
productivity. That is, an employers hiring and learning are endogenous to their pre-
vious hiring experiences with groups. Chapter II presents a new model of statistical
discrimination showing that this can lead to persistent discrimination against wor-
ker groups whose productivity is initially more uncertain to employers. Chapter III
presents supporting evidence on the endogenous formation of biased beliefs through
the endogenous learning mechanism in an experimental labor market implemented
through an online experiment. Chapter IV presents evidence that individual mana-
ger hiring decisions at a large US retail firm are influenced by their previous hiring
experiences with worker groups in the specific ways predicted by the endogenous
employer learning mechanism.
This dissertation presents and tests a new theory of discrimination with important
implications for the theoretical literature, empirical work, and policy. First, it pro-
vides a new conceptual justification for the pervasiveness and persistence of biased
employer beliefs in labor markets and documents empirical behavior consistent with
such biased beliefs. Second, while biased beliefs in my framework arise from statis-
tical discrimination by employers, their behavior does not reflect true worker group
differences because of their biased beliefs, and resulting discrimination in fact has si-
milar intuitive similarities with the alternative theory of taste-based discrimination.
This new theory thus blurs the line between the two classical theories of discrimina-
tion in economics, which are often presented and understood as distinct and mutually
exclusive. Third, since this type of discrimination arises from employers learning too
little about the productivity of worker groups, it has distinct implications than pre-
vious theories regarding policies which can induce employers to learn more or provide
them with additional information about worker groups.
2
CHAPTER II
Endogenous Learning, Persistent Employer Biases,
and Discrimination
2.1 Introduction
After decades of cultural change and anti-discrimination legislation, there remain
substantial labor market outcome differentials across race and gender (Lang and
Lehmann, 2012; Blau and Kahn, 2017). Models are key to understand the con-
tribution of discrimination to these differentials. Statistical discrimination arises
as a rational response to productivity differentials across worker groups, such that
employers have correct equilibrium beliefs about group productivity (Phelps, 1972;
Arrow, 1973; Aigner and Cain, 1977, Coate and Loury, 1993; Moro and Norman,
2004). Taste-based discrimination explains discrimination through exogenous prefe-
rences of employers for groups (Becker, 1957), creating differences between average
performance and average pay of groups. An alternative explanation is that discri-
mination arises from incorrect or biased beliefs of employers about the productivity
of groups.1 Then, discrimination does not reflect true group differentials, but arises
from a lack of information or learning. The distinction between statistical discrimi-
nation with biased beliefs and other theories is critical, because they can lead to very
different predictions regarding how discrimination arises and can be mitigated.
1See Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Reuben et al. (2014), Bordalo et al. (2016), Mobius et
al. (2016), Laouénan and Rathelot (2017), Van Dalen and Henkens (2019), Arnold et al. (2018),
Landsman (2018), Lesner (2018), Bohren et al. (2019a, 2019b), Bordalo et al. (2019), and Sarsons
(2019).
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One potential source of biased beliefs in the labor market is initial employer uncer-
tainty about the productivity of groups. That is, when employers enter the labor
market, they are not only uncertain about the individual productivity of potential
workers, but also the underlying productivity distribution of their group. If employ-
ers perceive that there may be a correlation between individual productivity and
group membership, for example due to historical or social factors disadvantaging
some groups, then they should value learning about group productivity since it can
improve hiring decisions in a statistical discrimination framework. A natural source
of employer learning about the productivity of groups is their own hiring experiences
with workers of these groups. In this context, previous experiences of an employer
with workers of a given group not only shape their beliefs about the group’s pro-
ductivity, but also their subsequent incentives to hire from the group and, indirectly,
to learn more about their productivity. Moreover, employer learning about the pro-
ductivity of minority or disadvantaged groups may be particularly important if there
is less initial information available about them in the labor market, making employers
more reliant on their own experiences to assess their productivity.
This paper presents a new model of statistical discrimination that captures these
intuitive insights and highlights their implications for labor market discrimination.
Employers perceive group membership as a potentially relevant indicator of indivi-
dual productivity and endogenously learn about group productivity through their
own hiring. In a dynamic setting, employers have noisier initial information on one
group’s productivity relative to another (Lundberg and Startz, 1983; Lang, 1986;
Cornell and Welch, 1996; Morgan and Várdy, 2009) and trade off learning about that
group against current-period profit maximization. A substantial component of the in-
formation observed through hiring is privately-observed by the hiring employer, such
that an employer’s hiring history shapes their future hiring and learning. Positive
experiences create positive biases, which endogenously correct themselves through
more hiring and learning. Negative experiences, however, create negative biases
which decrease hiring and learning.2 Differential learning across employers results in
2The dynamic decision problem I study has intuitive similarities with self-confirming equilibrium
models for non-cooperative games (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993a; 1993b). Both study the outcome
of a learning process in which agents learn from their experiences, beliefs are not contradicted
along the equilibrium path, and inefficiencies arise from insufficient learning. My model focuses on
learning about the environment rather than other players’ strategies, showing that some employers
optimally stop learning.
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a negatively-skewed distribution of beliefs about the group’s productivity.
Each period, employer beliefs determine market clearing wages, pinned down by
the beliefs of the marginal employer, and optimal hiring therefore follows a cutoff
rule in beliefs about a group’s productivity. Employers below the cutoff do not
hire from the group, preserving negative biases. The key prediction of the model
is that, over time, the skewness in the belief distribution can cause the wage of the
group about whose productivity employers have noisier initial information to fall
and remain below their expected productivity in the long run. The model predicts
discrimination due to uncertainty, even with equally productive worker groups and
without prior biases or endogenous worker responses.3 Further, since discrimination
arises endogenously from profit-maximizing decisions, it can survive competition in
the form of higher exit rates for biased employers if new entrants face a similar lear-
ning problem. In summary, heterogeneous biased beliefs persist within a statistical
discrimination framework; they are not necessarily eliminated through learning or
competition.
In the baseline model, employer learning is private and employers do not learn about
group productivity from observing the evolution of wages. Labor markets may pro-
vide few salient signals to an employer who decides to stop hiring from a group based
on their own experiences. First, evidence indicates that employers weight their own
experiences particularly heavily, because hiring outcomes of other employers are par-
tially unobservable, employment contexts differ across employers, and employers ove-
restimate the precision of their own information (Waldman, 1984; Moore et al., 2015;
Ge et al., 2020; Guenzel and Malmendier, 2020). Second, relative wages in practice
summarize how the market clears from mostly unobserved decentralized bilateral
bargaining outcomes, rather than an aggregate price signal, and depend on many
factors beyond employer beliefs like sectoral and occupational shifts, macroeconomic
shocks, and demographic changes. Accordingly, employers routinely isolating the
residual wage component that is due to changing subjective employer beliefs about
group productivity appears unrealistic, as exemplified by the decades-long debate
3Arrow (1973) mentions that biased priors could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy if employers
ignore subsequent information or worker responses confirm employer beliefs, but these models have
no learning. I provide a mechanism through which biased beliefs create discrimination without
biased priors, deviation from profit-maximization, or endogenous worker investments.
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on wage decomposition in economics (Lang and Lehmann, 2012).4 Nevertheless, I
consider an extension in which employers noisily learn from outside sources such as
other employers or wages. Discrimination can still persist if employers put more
weight on their own experiences and there is either dynamic entry of employers or
evolving productivity of worker groups. Accordingly, an intuitive interpretation of
the model is a cohort of employers learning about a cohort of workers, with imperfect
transfer across cohorts.
Unlike classical statistical discrimination models, I do not assume that employers
know group productivity or have correct equilibrium beliefs about it. Rather, I
model learning about groups, resulting in heterogeneous negatively biased beliefs
which arise from uncertainty about the information environment and can persist
with market clearing and endogenous wages. My model highlights that learning
about some groups can be slow, complementing the employer learning literature
which focuses on learning about individuals within groups (Farber and Gibbons,
1996; Lange, 2007; Arcidiacono et al. 2010; Kahn and Lange, 2014). The complex
trade off that firms face between exploration and extraction has long been recognized
as a key element of organizational learning (March, 1991) and a growing body of
research combines insights from bandit problems5 with statistical discrimination in
contexts other than group learning (Che et al., 2019; Bardhi et al., 2020; Bergman
et al., 2020; Fershtman and Pavan, 2020; Komiyama and Noda, 2020).
Like taste-based discrimination, my model generates differences between average per-
formance and average pay of a group. In fact, it generates steady state predictions
analogous to Becker (1957), with endogenous beliefs replacing preferences. Apparent
taste-based discrimination can result from “incorrect” statistical discrimination and
the model provides a new way to understand prejudice as the result of life experien-
ces shaping beliefs in distortionary ways. Biased beliefs in my model differ starkly
from a preference, highlighting that insights of prejudice-based models for labor mar-
ket discrimination can be generated from uncertainty, without reliance on a utility
function or biased updating.6
4Recent models in financial markets also consider agents who neglect the informational content
of prices (Eyster et al., 2019), building on extensive evidence from voting, trading, investing, and
auctions.
5See Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) for a review of bandit problems in economics.
6Individuals appear quick to form beliefs about groups and act on these in a way that shapes
6
Endogenous learning about groups differs from existing work on biased beliefs. Em-
ployers in my model are not fundamentally biased and attempt to maximize profits,
but they conduct inference on a biased sample of observations about worker group
productivity. The mechanism complements previous work on biased beliefs creating
discrimination from true group differentials (Bordalo et al., 2016), biased updating
(Sarsons, 2019), differences in the evaluation and supervision of workers (Bartoš et
al., 2016; Glover et al., 2017), or implicitly (Bertrand et al., 2005). The model high-
lights that initial uncertainty about the relative productivity of worker groups leads
to a learning problem that generates outcome differentials from biased beliefs. It
provides a rationale for how even employers with no fundamental prejudice or bias,
who are willing to give workers from any group a fair chance on profit maximization
grounds, may endogenously develop persistent negative biases about the productivity
of some groups.
This paper highlights that prejudice and statistical discrimination are not neces-
sarily distinct or mutually exclusive, with implications for studying the source of
discrimination (Bohren et al., 2019a; 2019b). The model generates different policy
implications than previous models. For example, it provides a new lens to analyze
affirmative action, which can induce employer learning by inducing minority hiring
and improve outcomes as reported in Miller (2017). Consistent with evidence revie-
wed in Lang and Kahn-Lang Spitzer (2020) and in contrast with classical theories of
discrimination, my model predicts that providing information on groups that is credi-
ble at the individual level can mitigate discrimination, as can encouraging intergroup
interactions (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Paluck et al., 2019).
future views, consistent with the notion of prejudice from psychology (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017).
My model shows 1) how biases can micro-found the reduced-form notion of prejudice in economics
and 2) how biases affect decision-making in statistical discrimination models. Beliefs are also parti-
cularly compatible with context-specific discrimination, such as variation across skill and education
levels (Lang and Lehmann, 2012).
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2.2 Labor Market Model
2.2.1 Employer Information and Beliefs
Consider a large number of employers hiring workers from two observably different
groups A and B (e.g. race or gender). The key feature is that, through hiring, em-
ployers learn about the productivity of worker groups, which may differ across groups
for example due to historical or social factors. Assume that employers know the pro-
ductivity distribution of group A, but are initially uncertain about that of group
B.7 Information asymmetries across worker groups are a common feature in the
literature, with the distinction that I focus on the dynamic implications of an initial
asymmetry for hiring and learning (Lang, 1986; Cornell and Welch, 1996; Morgan
and Várdy, 2009; Lang and Manove, 2011).8 Employers can learn about group B’s
productivity by hiring group B workers, but their objective is to maximize expected
profits, leading to a potential trade off. Previous hiring experiences determine beliefs
about the group’s productivity and the value of additional learning.
Each worker, from either group, has productivity drawn from X ∼ N(µ, 1/τ).9 For
simplicity, assume that employers know the variance 1/τ and that it is equal across
groups. Employers know that group A’s mean productivity is µ and have common
priors about the mean productivity of group B, µB ∼ N(µ0, 1/τ0).10 I focus on the
case where µ0 = µ, such that employers have unbiased priors. Each employer hires
one worker per period, uses their hiring experiences with group B to update their
beliefs, and the match dissolves after each period.11
7The key feature is that initial information about group B’s productivity is noisier, but assuming
complete information on group A simplifies the analysis and exposition.
8Information asymmetry could arise in a majority versus minority setting where market parti-
cipants naturally observe more information about the majority group over time. It could also arise
if employers, for example from group A, have better information about workers of their own group
due to previous experiences and interactions inside and outside the labor market.
9Appendix A extends the results to more general productivity distributions.
10Employers have misspecified beliefs, in the sense that groups are equally productive and the
true mean productivity of group B µ is a fixed constant, but employers treat it as a random variable
due to uncertainty.
11The implications of firm size are discussed in Appendix A. One-period contracts focus atten-
tion on group learning by studying employers repeatedly choosing between groups. Multi-period
contracts may slow down learning if employers retain good workers, but they do not change relative
incentives to hire and learn about group B, determined by µB .
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I make three simplifications relating to hiring and learning. First, employers ob-
serve no individual signal of productivity prior to hiring; they rely solely on group
membership to predict the productivity of a worker. Second, worker signals of pro-
ductivity are private and only available through an employer’s own hiring. Third,
there is no human capital investment or signaling by workers. Each worker is endo-
wed with a fixed productivity and inelastically provides a unit of labor each period.
The implications of each simplification are discussed in Section 2.2.8 and Appendix
A.
Workers hired from group B determine the information set of employer j, Sjt, com-
posed of one private signal drawn from X for each hire. The cumulative number of
signals employer j has observed by time t is Kjt =
∑t
n=1 1(LBnj = 1), where LBnj is
an indicator variable for whether a group B worker was hired in period n. Employers

















and Var(µB|Sjt) = 1τ0+τKjt , employers form poste-
rior beliefs about groupB productivityXB ∼ N(E[µB|Sjt],Var(µB|Sjt)+1/τ).12
2.2.2 Hiring Decision
Consider a frictionless labor market which clears each period. I first consider a mo-
del with infinitely-lived employers learning about one cohort of workers, abstracting
from product-market competition through dynamic entry and exit of firms. Em-
ployers are risk neutral, wage-takers, and maximize the present value of lifetime
profits. They consider the value of learning about the productivity of group B, lea-
ding to a dynamic optimization problem. An individual employer’s posterior beliefs
are characterized by ψSjt = {E[µB|Sjt],Var(µB|Sjt)} and Ψt is a list of posterior
12While the true variance in productivity 1/τ is known, the posterior variance of XB is larger





φ(x|m)(x− E[µB |Sjt])2dxdm = Var(µB |Sjt) + 1/τ .
9
beliefs across all employers. Group A’s wage, wA, is time-invariant and equal to
their expected productivity µ. Group B’s wage, wBt(Ψt), is set competitively across
employers through market clearing each period and evolves under the influence of
Ψt. The current-period employer payoff from hiring a worker is simply equal to the
productivity of their hire, xi, with expected value µ for group A and E[µB|Sjt] for
group B. Conditional on beliefs and wages at time t, employer j hires from group A
or B to maximize their expected profits
V (ψSjt , wBt(Ψt)) = Max{µ− wA + βEt[V (ψSjt+1 , wBt+1(Ψt+1))], (2.2)












Et[V (ψSjt+1 , ·)] since hiring from group B yields information which cannot decrease
expected profits.
Endogenizing group B’s wage is key because it is an outcome of interest, but also
because intuition suggests that it should act as a counterbalancing force to biased
beliefs. If the group’s wage falls as a result of employers developing negatively-
biased beliefs, then group B becomes relatively cheaper, which should in turn induce
employers to hire them and learn, correcting biases. I study hiring and learning
decisions which account for these endogenous wage adjustments.
Optimal hiring in the current period is determined by contrasting expected profits




, wBt+1(Ψt+1))− V (ψSjt+1 , wBt+1(Ψt+1))] > (2.3)
µ− Et[µB|Sjt]− (wA − wBt(Ψt)).
Equation (2.3) compares the expected learning value from a group B hire on the left
with expected foregone profit on the right. The perceived value of learning depends
on the likelihood that it will lead to changes in hiring and higher expected profits.
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It is maximized at µB = µ since information is likeliest to affect subsequent hiring
and decreases as µB becomes biased away from µ. In the case of negative bias, group
B becomes less attractive from both a learning and a production standpoint. Thus,
when prior experience suggests that group B is less productive, there is a trade
off between expected learning benefits and expected foregone profits from hiring
less productive workers. This trade off can be represented by a one-armed bandit
problem, in which employers repeatedly choose between a “safe” arm (Group A)
which yields a payoff from a known distribution and a “risky” arm (Group B) with
an unknown payoff distribution. Obtaining comparatively low payoffs from the risky
arm eventually leads the employer to stop experimenting and choose the safe arm,
with the important distinction that wages and therefore payoffs are endogenous in
my model.
One consideration is how employers learn about the productivity of group B from
the evolution of their wage. In the baseline model, I rule this out by assuming static
wage expectations: employers expect the wage next period to be equal to the current
one, E[wBt+1|Sjt] = wBt, keeping the model tractable since employers do not form
beliefs about the beliefs of other employers. The wage in theory does carry infor-
mation relevant to the learning problem faced by employers. Yet, in practice, this
assumption appears particularly mild given the complexity of the problem faced by
employers. Market clearing wages summarize many private decentralized decisions
that depend on factors unobserved by any given employer. Even if employers ob-
serve some relevant wage information and can invert the pricing and belief-updating
processes, relative wages in practice are a function of many factors (changing skill
and education, industry and occupation mixes, demographics, etc.), such that preci-
sely isolating the impact of changing subjective employer beliefs appears implausible.
Economists themselves have had long-standing unresolved debates about characte-
rizing and decomposing wage gaps into components related to discrimination (Lang
and Lehmann, 2012). Beyond recent work on financial markets which assumes that
agents ignore the information value of prices supported by extensive evidence (Eyster
et al., 2019), recent developments in modeling firm behavior surveyed in Aguirrega-
biria and Jeon (2019) focus on how uncertainty and learning in complex competitive
environments can lead firms to have biased beliefs, for example about demand, costs,
or the behavior of other firms.
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Overall, taking the current wage as a prediction for the wage next period seems like a
reasonable approximation in the context of the model, especially since it is correct in
the long run. Still, deviating from this assumption by allowing employers to noisily
learn about group B’s productivity from their wage does not affect the qualitative
predictions of the full model with dynamic market entry and exit of employers, as
discussed in Section 2.2.8.
2.2.3 Hiring Cutoff and the Group B Wage
Define λjt as the relative willingness to pay (WTP) of employer j for a group B
worker
λjt = βEt[V (ψ
′
Sjt+1
, wBt+1(Ψt+1))− V (ψSjt+1 , wBt+1(Ψt+1))]− (µ− Et[µB|Sjt]).
The trade-off between learning and foregone profit, ignoring wage considerations, is
captured by λjt . It can be positive even if E[µB|Sjt] falls below µ, highlighting that
employers may hire from group B even if they believe them to be less cost-effective
to avoid future losses from incorrect beliefs.
Each period, labor market clearing implies that, at current wages, the fraction of
employers who prefer to hire from group B is equal to the fraction of workers from
the group. The group B wage each period is thus determined by the marginal
employer m: the employer with the lowest λjt who must hire from the group to
clear the market. Specifically, the wage is set such that the marginal employer is
indifferent between hiring from either group, λmt = wBt(Ψt)−wA, characterizing the
optimal hiring strategy of employers stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition II.1 (Optimal Hiring)
The optimal hiring strategy of employers follows a cutoff rule where employer j hires
from group B at time t if and only if λjt ≥ λct . Moreover, λct = wBt(Ψt)− wA.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 characterizes the cutoff below which it is optimal for employers to
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avoid hiring from group B at a given market wage, preserving their beliefs about the
group’s productivity. Since the wage gap is determined by λct = λmt, the optimal
hiring decision of other employers immediately follows: those with λjt above the
marginal hire from group B and others from group A, clearing the market. Market
clearing thus implies the following condition
νΨt({ψSjt : λjt ≥ λct(wBt(Ψt))}) = FB and νΨt({ψSjt : λjt < λct(wBt(Ψt))}) = FA
(2.4)
where νΨt is a measure over Ψt, Fg is the fraction of workers from group g, and each
worker-employer pair has no incentive to deviate.
2.2.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a stochastic process over beliefs and a mapping from beliefs to
wages. Given a continuum of agents on each side of the market, this corresponds to
a deterministic Markov process with corresponding transition functions characterized
by Definition 1.
Definition II.1 An equilibrium is a Markov process with a distribution over beliefs
Ψt evolving according to a transition function T :M (R×R+)→M (R×R+), a wage
function wBt:
M (R× R+)→M R and an initial state Ψ0 ∈M (R× R+) such that every period:
1. Employers make expected profit maximizing hiring decisions following equation
(2.2)
and Proposition 1 for all (ψSjt , wBt(Ψt)).
2. The labor market clears according to condition (2.4).
3. Employers update their beliefs:
a) Those with beliefs ψSjt such that λjt < λ
c
t(wBt(Ψt)) hold posterior beliefs
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ψSjt+1 = ψSjt.




derived according to equation (2.1).
The first condition states that employers maximize their expected profits according
to their Bellman equation and the optimal hiring rule. The second condition states
that the fraction of employers with beliefs such that they want to hire from group
B given current wages (λjt above the marginal) is equal to the fraction of workers
from group B. The third condition states that employers below the hiring cutoff for
group B do not update their beliefs, while those above the hiring cutoff update their
beliefs based on the productivity of their hire according to Bayes’ rule.
2.2.5 Biased Beliefs and Discrimination
As a result of the optimal hiring rule and equation (2.1), it is straightforward to
characterize the asymptotic distribution of posterior beliefs described in Proposition
2.
Proposition II.2 (Asymptotic Beliefs and Persistent Negative Biases)
As t → ∞, beliefs of employers who remain above the hiring cutoff converge in
distribution to µ. Others hold a range of beliefs such that E[µB|Sjt] < µ. The
limiting fraction of employers with E[µB|Sjt] < µ equals the fraction of group A
workers.
Proof: See Appendix A.
By standard Bayesian reasoning, posterior beliefs converge to the truth as the num-
ber of signals goes to infinity. On the other hand, employers below the cutoff (which
implies E[µB|Sjt] < µ in the long run given a strictly positive value of learning)
do not hire from group B, preserving negative biases. In the long run, since un-
biased employers hire from group B and biased employers hire from group A, the
fraction of biased employers is equal to the fraction of group A workers.13 Proposi-
13The Becker (1957) taste-based model requires that the fraction of prejudiced employers be at
least as large as the fraction of group A workers to generate a wage gap. Both models thus require a
majority of biased or prejudiced employers to generate a wage gap if group A is larger than group B.
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tion 2 highlights that optimal hiring and learning lead a subset of employers to hold
negatively-biased beliefs, even asymptotically.
Endogenous employer learning about worker group productivity generates a plausi-
ble distribution of beliefs for discrimination to arise. First, beliefs about group B’s
productivity exhibit sustained heterogeneity across employers. Second, differential
learning across employers results in beliefs being negatively-skewed. The endogenous
learning mechanism generates these features without relying on group differentials,14
prejudice, or biased priors, providing a novel way to understand persistent, hetero-
geneous, negatively-biased beliefs about a worker group’s productivity.
The next consideration is whether these biased beliefs generate discrimination in
the form of a wage gap. Proposition 3 characterizes the evolution of group B’s
wage.
Proposition II.3 (Wage Gap and Persistent Discrimination)
wBt(Ψt) is strictly decreasing in t and converges to a constant c < wA.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The distribution of beliefs becomes negatively-skewed with time, because only nega-
tive bias can be stable. With hiring experience, supramarginal values of λjt become
concentrated around 0 as E[µB|Sjt] becomes concentrated around µ. By definition,
λmt lies below supramarginal values of λjt and thus eventually falls below 0, leading
wBt(Ψt) to fall below wA. By market clearing, the wage cannot increase or remain
constant with time. Given a continuum of employers, some employers just above the
hiring cutoff are expected to have relatively negative hiring experiences with group
B in any given period, such that their λjt fall below that period’s cutoff. Then, the
fraction of employers who prefer to hire from group B at the current wage becomes
lower than the fraction of group B workers. The wage must thus decrease to induce
The fraction of employers with biased beliefs in my model is endogenously determined to be exactly
equal to that of group A by market clearing, rather than being assumed. Widespread biased beliefs
may be more plausible than widespread animus, and Lang and Lehmann (2012) discusses evidence
that a large share of employers hold negative perceptions in the context of race. Moreover, Black
(1995) shows that wage gaps may be sustained under milder conditions in a search framework, as
briefly discussed in Appendix A.
14This distinction has important implications even when it is unlikely that two groups have
equal productivity in practice, since it predicts that closing productivity gaps would not necessarily
eliminate discrimination.
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employers to hire from the group and clear the market. Lastly, since beliefs are
fixed asymptotically, there is virtually no updating and no change in the wage, so it
converges to a constant.
Since both groups are equally productive, the wage gap implies that group B is
paid below their expected productivity. While the predicted wage gap depends on
relative group productivity, the prediction that group B is paid below their expected
productivity does not. The model thus predicts that persistent negatively biased
employer beliefs about group B’s productivity arise endogenously through hiring
interactions and generate persistent discrimination against the group.
2.2.6 Entry, Exit and Competition
A common view is that market competition should drive out biased beliefs and there-
fore resulting discrimination, at least in the long run. To investigate this, I augment
the model with dynamic employer entry and exit from the market. The fundamen-
tal intuition regarding differential learning across employers and therefore biased
beliefs remains, but exit provides a straightforward reduced-form way to introduce
competition through differential exit rates based on beliefs.
Employers exit the market and are replaced with new employers at an expected
aggregate rate δ each period. The exit rate influences the expected duration in the
market, learning incentives, and available time for employers to potentially correct
their biases. It can also directly affect the belief distribution by introducing new
employers who hold different beliefs on average. I assume that employers enter with
unbiased priors, although Appendix A shows that discrimination can be amplified
when priors are influenced by experienced employers.15
Hiring and wage determination follow the same process as before. Profit maximiza-
15Prior variance may decrease if employers learn from previous cohorts of employers. This is un-
likely to eliminate the initial information asymmetry since it would require employers to completely
ignore their experiences, going against evidence that decision-makers put too much weight on their
own information (Moore et al., 2015), and because the learning problem in practice is constantly
changing across cohorts of workers, such that employers must rely on their experiences to assess
group productivity in their own context. For example, the relative education and experience of
women and minority workers compared to that of white men was not the same in 1990 as it is
today, and employment contexts have changed substantially.
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tion is given by
V (ψSjt , wBt(Ψt)) = Max{µ− wA + (1− δ)βEt[V (ψSjt+1 , wBt+1(Ψt+1))],




The exit rate of an employer should depend on profits and therefore hiring decisions
determined by Et[µB|Sjt]. Since Et[V (ψ
′
Sjt+1
, ·)] ≥ Et[V (ψSjt+1 , ·)], employers who
hire from group B earn higher expected profits of at least wA−wBt each period. Given
a lower wage and equal productivity for group B, these employers are more profitable
and accordingly should have a lower market exit rate, δB < δA with δ = δBFB+δAFA.
If the only determinant of market exit is beliefs about the productivity of group B
(δB = 0), a differential exit rate eliminates discrimination at least in the limit.
16 Yet,
firm survival in a market depends on many factors, such that firms who hire from
group B also exit the market and biased beliefs may often not be pivotal (Audretsch,
1991; Schary, 1991; Black, 1995; Hellerstein et al., 2002).
The key point is that biased beliefs are not a primitive of the model, but arise
endogenously. Therefore, as some employers held unbiased priors but developed
biased beliefs through hiring, so may new employers. In the aggregate, biased beliefs
and the wage gap are not necessarily eliminated by competition. Depending on
parameters, a wage gap can be sustained asymptotically even if employers who hire
from group A are driven out at a higher rate, as summarized in Remark 1.17
Remark 1 (Persistent Discrimination with Market Competition)
For some values of δA and δB with δA > δB, there exists a period t̄ in which wBt(Ψt)
falls below wA, remains below for all t > t̄, and converges to a constant c < wA.
Remark 1 is illustrated through simulation in the next subsection. The main diffe-
16Beliefs of employers above the hiring cutoff for group B converge to the group’s true producti-
vity, so an arbitrarily small mass of new entrants with λjt ≥ 0 guarantees that wBt is not below
wA.
17In taste-based models, firm growth is important since prejudiced firms may remain in the market
earning lower profits to indulge in their taste for discrimination. Then, discrimination is mitigated
because unprejudiced firms grow more quickly. In my model, firms are not willing to accept a lower
return for their mistaken beliefs, so growth is not conceptually necessary for discrimination to be
competed away.
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rence with Proposition 3 is that the existence of a wage gap depends on parameters.
At one extreme, for exit rates near zero, the existence of a wage gap directly follows
from Proposition 3. At the other extreme, for very high exit rates, it is possible to
introduce enough new employers with unbiased priors to hire all of group B each
period, eliminating the wage gap. At the intensive margin, higher competition re-
duces the magnitude of the wage gap as shown in Appendix A and consistent with
empirical evidence (Ashenfelter and Hannan, 1986; Black and Strahan, 2001). At
the extensive margin, competition may not eliminate discrimination arising from
endogenous biased beliefs.
2.2.7 Simulations
To illustrate the model’s dynamics, a set of simulations was computed over 1,000
periods with 10,000 employers and 10,000 workers, 25% of which are from group B.
Simulation details are outlined in Appendix A, along with additional results. Because
the simulated market is finite, the evolution of beliefs and wages is stochastic rather
than deterministic. Emphasis should be put on the model dynamics characterized
by Propositions 1-3 and Remark 1, which do no substantively vary with parameter
choice, rather than specific values of the wage gap.18
Panel A of Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of beliefs for key moments of the distri-
bution, without entry and exit. The 25% of employers with the highest valuation
for group B each period hire them and learn, so their beliefs converge towards the
group’s true mean productivity normalized at 0, while those of other employers are
negatively biased and do not evolve. Panel B shows that the group B wage initially
lies above the marginal employer’s beliefs due to the value of learning, but eventually
falls and remains below zero (also normalized as the group A wage) as beliefs fall
below µ and the value of learning falls. With a finite market, there is a separation
in the WTP of employers above and below the cutoff, seen in Panel A between the
75th and 76th percentiles. The market clearing wage can lie anywhere between these
18Similarly, the initial state in which employers enter the market exhibits theoretically intuitive
features, but is of limited practical interest. Given all employers entering simultaneously with
unbiased priors, the initial group B wage may be higher than that of group A because of market
clearing, but this depends on prior beliefs, relative uncertainty and productivity across groups, and
potential ambiguity aversion.
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two percentiles, while the latter determines the wage with a continuum of employers
as characterized in Proposition 3. If match surplus is allocated to employers, the
wage is also set by the 76th percentile with a finite number of employers, as shown
in Panel B.
Similarities and differences between the simulated wage path and empirical wage
trends, namely whether the wage is increasing, stable, or decreasing over time, natu-
rally do not provide a test of the model’s key implications. Empirical trends depend
on many sources of wage differentials outside of the model, while simulated trends
depend on assumptions on priors and relative productivity, among others. For exam-
ple, Appendix A shows that negatively-biased priors can generate a group B wage
which starts and remains below that of group A, but increases over time. An analo-
gous argument can explain the seemingly odd model prediction that employers begin
by hiring group B most often and gradually decrease their hiring of the group, rather
than potentially the other way around.
Figure 2.2 presents simulations with market entry and exit, a 2% aggregate exit rate
each period, and a 25% higher exit rate for employers below the hiring cutoff. The
set of employers in the market is expected to be jointly replaced 3 to 4 times over
the period, so the pattern is simply repeated beyond. One notable difference is that,
since all employers exit the market in finite time, some employers above the hiring
cutoff may always have negatively-biased beliefs. There is thus a sense in which entry
and exit can actually help sustain a wage gap by preventing belief convergence.
2.2.8 Outside Learning
If employers observe information about group B’s productivity outside of their own
hiring, such as the hiring decisions or outcomes of a competitor, the performance of
group B in other settings, or the evolution of wages, they may learn without hiring.
Such outside learning can mitigate or exacerbate bias, but has limited impact on the
model’s key predictions.
Consider a benchmark case in which employers get one outside signal about group
B productivity per period irrespective of hiring. Outside signals are distributed
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There are several reasons to expect that employers put more weight on their own
signals, τo < τ . Even at similar firms, there is some degree of mismatch between
employment contexts. It may be difficult for an employer to learn about the pro-
ductivity of group B from observing others when hiring and performance depend on
many factors beyond employer beliefs. The employer learning literature indicates
that learning is asymmetric; employers have better information on their hires than
other employers do (Waldman, 1984; Kahn, 2013; Ge et al., 2020). Employers also
have a tendency to over-weight their own information (Moore et al., 2015). Chap-
ter IV reports in the context of a large national retailer that a manager’s hiring of
black workers is influenced by their own previous hiring experiences with the group,
but not those of other managers even within the same store. Similarly, recovering
a signal about group B’s productivity from wage information that is relevant to a
given employer’s specific hiring context is likely to be particularly difficult. In short,
it’s not clear what form outside information would need to take to be credible at the
individual level to an employer who has already formed beliefs based on their own
experience.
If employers put more weight on their own signals, then those who hire group B still
learn faster, especially if they also observe outside signals. The belief distribution
remains negatively-skewed in any finite period, and the bias-generating mechanism
at the least slows down learning. Slowing down learning itself has non-negligible
implications. Statistical discrimination generally predicts that the market immedia-
tely learns equilibrium worker group productivity. One criticism is that learning is
“too fast” for these models to be important in the long run (Lang and Lehmann,
2012). My model explains why learning about some groups may be particularly slow
and create discrimination along the equilibrium path, reducing the lifetime income
of these groups.
In the long run, if beliefs converge over time, then the wage gap is eliminated. If
beliefs do not fully converge, for example because there is market entry and exit or
the learning problem evolves over time, then the wage gap can remain. In practice,
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these two conditions are clearly satisfied. Firms, employers, and recruiters regularly
enter and exit the market, and the relative productivity of worker groups has been
evolving with changes in demographics and education, among other factors. Remark
2 summarizes this result for the case of market entry and exit, which again follows
from Proposition 3.
Remark 2 (Persistent Discrimination with Outside Learning)
For some values of τo, τ , δA, and δB with τ > τo and δA > δB, there exists a period
t̃ in which wBt(Ψt) falls below wA, remains below for all t > t̃, and converges to a
constant c < wA.
Moreover, outside information also poses some challenges. For instance, making
hiring outcomes public within employer networks does not conceptually solve the
issue that employers learn too little, because it lowers incentives for employers to hire
group B and learn from their own signals, leading to free-riding (Keller et al., 2005;
Hoelzemann and Klein, 2018). Equation (2.5) also assumes that outside signals are
unbiased, unambiguous, and unrelated to existing bias. Otherwise, outside signals
could preserve or exacerbate biased beliefs (DeGroot, 1974; Gentzkow and Shapiro,
2006; Baliga et al., 2013; Enke and Zimmermann, 2017; Fryer et al., 2018). In
any case, outside learning suggests two implications. First, discrimination may differ
across settings based on the observability of competitors, workers, wages, and output.
Second, there is potential scope for the design and provision of information.
2.3 Relationship with Other Theories
The model generates steady state predictions analogous to those from Becker (1957),
with preferences replaced by endogenous beliefs:
• An employer hires group A if the wage gap is smaller than λjt and group B
otherwise.
• If enough employers have (approximately) correct beliefs to hire all of group
B, there is effective segregation without wage gap.
• If enough employers have biased beliefs, there is a wage gap determined by the
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marginal employer.
The model has intuitive similarities with taste-based discrimination, namely a dif-
ference between average productivity and average pay of a group, but without de-
viating from a statistical discrimination framework. This is a key point given that
taste-based discrimination has often been criticized for the arbitrariness of including
preferences in a utility function. The important insights of prejudice-based models
for labor market discrimination do not in fact rely on preferences, but can be under-
stood as arising from uncertainty. Biased beliefs capture context-dependent aspects
such as gender-based discrimination and differentials by skill and education, which
are less compatible with the notion of an aversion to contact. Widespread biased
beliefs may also be more plausible than widespread overt animus, which evidence
suggests has been steadily decreasing over past decades, unlike outcome differentials
(Lang and Lehmann, 2012). This does not imply that preferences and biased beliefs
are necessarily substitutes, because they differ fundamentally in how discrimination
arises, evolves, and can be mitigated.19
The model complements the statistical discrimination literature by relaxing the as-
sumption that employers have correct equilibrium beliefs about group productivity
and instead modeling learning. In many contexts, the assumption that employers
know the productivity of worker groups or instantly learn it in equilibrium seems im-
plausible, yet little work considers how relaxing the assumption can have important
implications.20 Discrimination caused by biased beliefs can arise without grounds
for classical statistical discrimination. It does not arise from employers using ob-
jective information about groups, but their potentially flawed beliefs. It is not a
self-fulfilling prophecy nor the result of coordination failures between firms and wor-
kers. The discriminated-against group cannot be seen as having “played a hand” in
justifying discrimination against them, and discrimination can be sustained without
prior bias or homogeneous beliefs.21
19If biased beliefs are reinforced through behavioral primitives in the utility function, they could
be essentially indistinguishable from a taste. Individuals with a taste for discrimination may gather
and interpret information in a way that validates and justifies their prejudice (Nickerson, 1998).
20Aigner and Cain (1977) state in their model that group means “are estimated without bias” by
employers and that “as an explanation of discrimination against blacks, a theory of discrimination
based on employers’ mistakes is even harder to accept than the explanation based on employers’
‘tastes for discrimination,’ because the ‘tastes’ are at least presumed to provide a source of ‘psychic
gain’ (utility) to the discriminator.”
21The homogeneous prior assumption usually made in the literature can be important to generate
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Another point concerns efficiency and equality. In statistical discrimination models,
outcomes usually reflect true average productivity, so ending discrimination may not
help group B on average. As a result, this type of discrimination is generally regarded
as efficient. In my model, workers are paid below their expected productivity because
of what are essentially employer mistakes. A social planner concerned with inequality
or equality of opportunity could improve group B outcomes at no efficiency cost
through increased employer learning.
2.4 Implications for Empirical Work and Policy
Discrimination from biased beliefs is consistent with a growing body of evidence. It
has implications for identifying the source of discrimination, which has traditionally
meant distinguishing between taste-based and statistical discrimination. Empirical
tests often provide indirect evidence by comparing observed outcomes to those ex-
pected from true group differences, with the residual classified as taste. Such logic
is conceptually inadequate, because the absence of observable productivity differen-
tials does not imply a taste for discrimination given statistical discrimination with
incorrect beliefs. Similarly, employers responding to information is consistent with
statistical discrimination, but does not imply that employers hold correct beliefs on
average or use information correctly. Bohren et al. (2019a) studies the empirical
identification challenge posed by biased beliefs and stresses that they are rarely con-
sidered in the literature. My model provides a new bias-generating mechanism in the
labor market and blurs the line between the two classical theories, highlighting that
biased beliefs should not be ignored as a potential source of discrimination.
Identifying the source of discrimination is important partly because policy impli-
cations can differ. Competition can mitigate discrimination in the case of taste or
biased beliefs, but may not eliminate it if information asymmetries remain. Closing
productivity gaps may mitigate discrimination based on true group differentials, but
those are not necessary for belief-based discrimination to persist. Diversity or impli-
cit bias training could provide relevant information about groups, but if they target
long-run discrimination. Otherwise, some employers may be better at interpreting signals (Aigner
and Cain, 1977) or have more accurate priors (Coate and Loury, 1993). Other employers would
learn or exit the market, such that the need for the discriminated-against group to adjust is unclear.
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cognitive biases and implicit stereotypes, will not address biased beliefs as in my
model. Providing information on individual productivity may mitigate statistical
discrimination by decreasing reliance on group membership, but information on pro-
ductivity may help distinguish between the different theories. Information about
groups should have little impact if employers have correct beliefs on average or if
animus is driving discrimination, but may mitigate biased beliefs consistent with
mounting evidence surveyed in Lang and Kahn-Lang Spitzer (2020). As mentioned
previously, information about groups must be perceived as informative to an em-
ployer who has potentially already formed beliefs based on their own experience.
Accordingly, policies which induce individual employers to learn more through their
experiences may be particularly effective.
Indeed, central to the model is the idea that employers learn about groups through
interaction and exposure. My model provides a new lens to study policies like in-
ternships, worker subsidies, and affirmative action which can push employers to hire
more workers from group B and learn, consistent with improved minority outcomes
as documented in Miller (2017). Critics of affirmative action often state that the
worker best qualified for a position should be hired, independent of group members-
hip. This argument hinges on the assumption that employers know ex-ante which
worker is most qualified and therefore have correct beliefs about group productivity.
My model suggests that this may not be the case and that affirmative action may in
fact be necessary to move towards the point where the worker best qualified for a po-
sition is hired, independent of group membership. Relatedly, Pettigrew and Tropp
(2006) and Paluck et al. (2019) conclude from their surveys that intergroup con-
tact, particularly intense collaborative exposure and integration, typically reduces
prejudice. These predictions follow directly from my framework of belief updating.
One historical example is World War II, often discussed as a shock through which
employers learned about the productivity of women and minority groups (Goldin,
1991).
Consistent with endogenous employer learning about groups, Leung (2017) docu-
ments on an online job board that previous hiring experiences of employers with
workers from particular countries affect the subsequent likelihood of hiring workers
from those countries. Chapter IV uses longitudinal employment records from a large
US retailer and documents that the hiring history of managers creates heterogeneity
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in their hiring of worker groups. Managers increase (decrease) their relative hiring of
black and white workers following positive (negative) experiences with these groups,
with proportionally larger impacts for black workers consistent with stronger upda-
ting by managers. Further, early negative experiences with black workers persistently
decrease relative hiring of the group over subsequent hiring cycles, unlike early po-
sitive experiences or early negative ones with white workers. These findings are
particularly consistent with the idea that hiring experiences of employers lead them
to update their beliefs about the performance of worker groups, affecting subsequent
hiring patterns in a manner consistent with endogenous employer learning syste-
matically decreasing relative hiring of minority workers. These papers suggest that
studying how individual discriminatory responses evolve over time is a key avenue
to test belief-based discrimination and distinguish it from other sources.
Regarding HR policy, firms with decentralized hiring in which individual managers
hold discretionary power may especially have incentives to eliminate biased beliefs
as studied in this paper. Hoffman et al. (2018) finds that managers who hire against
job-testing technology recommendations tend to hire worse workers, consistent with
mistakes or biases. Berson et al. (2019) suggests that discrimination among large
firms appears lower at firms with centralized hiring. Bergman et al. (2020) study
resume screening algorithms in a setting where firms balance selecting workers from
previously successful groups with selecting from under-represented groups. They
find that algorithms which value learning can improve both hiring performance and
diversity, suggesting that policies which gather and share information within firms
can help mitigate the impact of individual biased beliefs.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper presents a new statistical discrimination model in which persistent, hete-
rogeneous employer biased beliefs about the productivity of worker groups arise and
can create discrimination. Given initial uncertainty about the relative productivity
of worker groups, employers systematically develop biased beliefs through endoge-
nous learning decisions influenced by their previous hiring experiences with groups.
These biased beliefs can create discrimination against worker groups whose producti-
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vity is initially more uncertain to employers, even with expected profit-maximizing
employers in a competitive market with equally-productive worker groups, no prior
bias or prejudice, and without endogenous worker investments.
Empirical evidence from an experimental labor market designed to test the individual-
level implications of endogenous employer learning on hiring and beliefs supports the
model’s core mechanism. Positive experiences with a worker group lead to more hi-
ring and learning, correcting positive biases. Negative experiences decrease hiring
and learning, preserving negative biases and leading to a negatively-skewed employer
belief distribution about the productivity of a worker group whose productivity is
initially unknown.
The model generates steady state predictions analogous to Becker (1957), replacing
preferences with endogenous biased beliefs and highlighting that some of what is
usually classified as a taste may be understood as biased beliefs. It provides a new
way to understand prejudice in the labor market as the result of selected interactions
between groups distorting beliefs and behavior. It generates these novel implicati-
ons while being set within a statistical discrimination framework in which learning
about groups is modeled explicitly, complementing previous models in that litera-
ture. Biased beliefs in this paper arise from information frictions, with implications
for understanding the relationship between theories of discrimination, empirically
studying the source of discrimination, and policy.
The model focuses on profit-maximizing employers who are Bayesian over their own
experiences, although existing work documents behavioral elements which could am-
plify discrimination based on biased beliefs and increase the connection with pre-
ferences. This interaction is a natural direction for future research and suggests
that biased beliefs in this model may constitute a lower bound in many empirical
settings.
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Marginal (p75) Wage Gap
Marginal Beliefs and the Wage Gap
The fraction of group B workers is 0.25. Worker productivity is distributed N(0, 2), prior beliefs are distributed
N(0, 1). wA is normalized to 0 and β is set to 0.9.
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Marginal (p75) Wage Gap
Marginal Beliefs and the Wage Gap
The aggregate exit rate corresponds to 2% each period, with a 25% higher exit rate for employers below the hiring
cutoff for group B. New entrants have mean beliefs equal to 0 (unbiased). See Figure 2.1 for other parameter choices.
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CHAPTER III
Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Stereotype
Formation and Hiring Discrimination
3.1 Introduction
Evidence across the social sciences suggests the existence of pervasive negative per-
ceptions against certain groups of workers in the labor market (Kirschenman and
Neckerman, 1991; Holzer, 1996; Wilson, 1996; Biernat and Kobrynowicz, 1997; Moss
and Tilly, 2001; Pager and Karafin, 2009; Pager et al., 2009). In economics, a
growing literature studies the role of negative perceptions, as potentially biased or
incorrect beliefs about groups, in generating discrimination (Fershtman and Gneezy,
2001; Bertrand et al., 2005; Reuben et al., 2014; Bordalo et al., 2016; Mobius et al.,
2016; Arnold et al., 2018; Bohren et al., 2019a; 2019b; Bordalo et al. 2019; Sarsons,
2020). Yet, little work focuses on specific mechanisms through which biased beliefs
can arise, persist, and generate discrimination in a labor market setting.1
This chapter uses an experimental labor market to test the theoretical mechanism
proposed in Chapter 2 through which negatively-biased beliefs about the producti-
vity of worker groups arise endogenously through hiring experiences of employers
with workers. The intuition for the mechanism is as follows. If employers are un-
certain about the productivity distribution of worker groups when they begin hiring
1For example, a standard assumption in the statistical discrimination literature is that employers
learn about the productivity of individual workers, but not that of groups. They either have com-
plete information about groups (Aigner and Cain, 1977) or are assumed to have correct equilibrium
beliefs about group productivity (Coate and Loury, 1993).
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workers, then, through their own hiring experiences, employers learn about both the
productivity of their hires and that of their group. The nature of hiring experiences
with a group then determine subsequent incentives to hire from the group again and
learn more about their productivity, generating differential hiring and learning across
employers. Positive experiences create positive biases which correct themselves since
they lead employers to hire from the group again and learn about their producti-
vity. Negative experiences lead employers to reduce or stop hiring from the group on
expected productivity grounds, decreasing learning, preserving negative biases, and
creating a negatively-skewed belief distribution about the group’s productivity. An
employer’s hiring history with a group thus endogenously shapes their subsequent
hiring and learning, disproportionately impacting workers from groups whose pro-
ductivity is initially more uncertain to employers, such as minority groups (Lundberg
and Startz, 1983; Lang, 1986; Cornell and Welch, 1996; Morgan and Várdy, 2009;
Lang and Manove, 2011).
Crucially, the mechanism recasts biased beliefs as the systematic result of expected
profit maximization and Bayesian updating of employers over their own experien-
ces in a setting of initial uncertainty about the productivity distribution of worker
groups. It does not rely on taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957), productivity
differences, self-fulfilling prophecies, or biased employer priors. The mechanism de-
parts from those based on the distortion of true group differences (Bordalo et al.,
2016), bias in the evaluation of workers (Bartoš et al., 2016), or bias in the belief
updating itself (Sarsons, 2020), highlighting a distinct complementary source of bias.
It reflects the notion that a substantial component of the information that an em-
ployer observes through their hiring is privately observed and that an employer’s own
experiences may play a particularly important role in shaping their beliefs and beha-
vior (Waldman, 1984; Kahn, 2013; Moore et al., 2015; Ge et al., 2020; Guenzel and
Malmendier, 2020). It also provides a rationale for how even employers with no fun-
damental bias, who are willing to give workers from any group a fair chance on profit
maximization grounds, may endogenously develop persistent negative biases about
the productivity of some groups. As a result, biased beliefs may be more widespread,
pervasive, and resistant to market forces than typically understood.
I create a controlled environment to study how biased beliefs arise through endoge-
nous employer learning about groups. I specifically abstract away from existing real
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life biases and discrimination by creating minimal worker groups where membership
is randomly assigned to one of two color groups.2 Workers perform the real-effort task
of solving character puzzles on the computer, which corresponds to their productivity
in the context of the experiment. Employers then repeatedly hire workers, choosing
between one of the two groups each period and observing their hire’s productivity.
They are incentivized to hire the most productive workers available, requiring them
to identify which group is more productive, if any. I study how negative biases about
group productivity arise from an employer’s hiring history. I give employers better
initial information on the productivity of one group and focus on hiring and learning
about the other group. I elicit employer beliefs about the group’s productivity after
each time they hire a worker from the group, allowing me to track the evolution of
biased beliefs and their impact on subsequent hiring behavior.
The results show that negative hiring experiences with the group whose productivity
is initially more uncertain, captured through the hiring of relatively low productivity
workers, lead to persistent negatively-biased beliefs about the group’s productivity,
specifically by decreasing subsequent hiring of the group and therefore learning. In
contrast, positive experiences increase subsequent hiring and learning, mitigating
positive biases. Across employers, differential hiring and learning generate a per-
sistent negatively-skewed distribution of beliefs about the group’s productivity. In
fact, compared to their initial belief distribution, employers on average have no more
accurate beliefs about the group’s productivity after the hiring experiment. Using
additional experimental treatments, I also show that the specific hiring context mat-
ters for the formation of biased beliefs. In particular, evidence suggests that bias
formation against a group is particularly strong when it is presented as a minority
group and when employers are not primed to think about their beliefs until the end
of the experiment. Lastly, I also provide evidence that employers update their be-
liefs by more than a Bayesian benchmark following their experiences, consistent with
stereotype formation amplifying the effects of the endogenous learning mechanism
in practice.
Experiments have frequently been used to study features of discrimination in econo-
2Using minimal groups based on arbitrary characteristics is particularly valuable to isolate the
mechanism by abstracting from existing beliefs associated with groups like gender or ethnicity
(Tajfel et al., 1971; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Sutter, 2009; Goette et al., 2012).
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mics (Charness and Kuhn, 2011; Neumark, 2018). They are particularly well-suited
to study belief-based discrimination because they provide a rare environment in
which beliefs can be observed and mapped into behavior. Fershtman and Gneezy
(2001), Mobius et al. (2006), Mobius et al. (2016) and Bohren et al. (2019a; 2019b)
provide experimental evidence of discriminatory behavior driven by biased beliefs in
the case of gender, beauty, and ethnicity. Dianat et al. (2018) conducts an experi-
ment in which differences in human capital investment across worker groups lead to
statistical discrimination which persists partly because employer beliefs about groups
are slow to adjust. In contrast, rather than documenting existing biases against spe-
cific groups, I focus on how biases arise endogenously in a hiring setting with no
grounds for discrimination based on productivity differentials to arise and explicitly
distinguish biased beliefs from taste-based discrimination. Since initial experiences
play a particularly important role in determining future hiring and beliefs, the me-
chanism relates intuitively to work on the lasting consequences of first impressions
(Olivora and Todorov, 2010; Agnew et al., 2018; Oh et al., 2020).
3.2 Theoretical Framework
Chapter 2 presents a formal model of the mechanism and hypotheses presented in
this section. Consider two groups of workers Gray (G) and Orange (O), both with
i.i.d. productivity X ∼ N(µ, 1/τ). Employers are initially uncertain about potential
group differences in productivity and thus perceive group membership as a relevant
indicator of productivity.3
For expositional simplicity, assume that employers know the distribution of producti-
vity for group O and the variance in productivity for both groups. This corresponds
to a one-armed bandit problem: employers hire from group O (safe arm) with known
productivity distribution or Group G (risky arm) with unknown mean producti-
vity.4 Employers have priors about the mean productivity of group G given by
3In practice, employer estimates of productivity also depend on individual signals like resumes,
but these have little impact on the mechanism’s qualitative implications, as discussed in chapter 2.
4See Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) for an overview of bandit problems. They have been
implemented in experiments studying whether participants follow optimal strategies, showing that
participants value learning but switch between arms too often and learn less than optimal (Meyer
and Shi, 1995; Banks et al., 1997). One explanation for this last finding is ambiguity aversion
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µG ∼ N(µ0, 1/τ0) and learn about the group through hiring. Hires from group G
determine the information set of employer j at time t, Stj, composed of one private














n=1 1(LGnj = 1) and LGnj is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
employer j hires a group G worker in period n.
Employers are wage-takers and maximize expected profits by hiring one worker each
period
V (ψStj , wGt(Ψt)) = Max{µ− wO + βEt[V (ψSt+1,j , wGt+1(Ψt+1))],




where ψStj = {E[µG|Stj],Var(µG|Stj)} summarizes an employer’s beliefs and Ψt is
a list of beliefs across employers. When employers hire from group G, V (·) inclu-
des updated beliefs, and remains constant otherwise (ψStj = ψSt+1,j). I focus on
individual employer decision-making, taking worker wages as exogenous constants
(wGt(Ψt) = wG = wO).
5 There is a trade off between benefits and costs of learning
about group G, and whether employers hire from the group depends on their previous




)− V (ψSt+1,j)] ≥ µ− Et[µG|Stj]
which contrasts the expected information value of hiring from group G with the
(potentially negative) expected cost in terms of foregone productivity. Optimal hiring
follows a cutoff rule (Gittins and Jones, 1974). Employers hire from group G as long
as their posterior beliefs are such that their expected value from hiring G is higher
(Anderson, 2001; 2012).
5Chapter 2 shows that endogenizing wages leads to a lower wage for group G.
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than that of hiring O. If it starts below or falls below, employers switch to group O
for all future periods since the decision problem remains unchanged.
Positive experiences, defined as hiring group G workers with productivity above that
expected from group O, lead employers to continue hiring from group G on expected
productivity grounds and learn about their productivity. Negative experiences, de-
fined as hires with productivity below that expected from group O, lower the value
of hiring from the group, reducing hiring and preserving beliefs. Negative biases are
more persistent than positive ones, leading to a negatively-skewed belief distribution
across employers.
To summarize, the mechanism leads to the following set of hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1. Positive hiring experiences lead to a higher estimate of group
G’s mean productivity and more hiring from the group.
• Hypothesis 2. Negative hiring experiences lead to a lower estimate of group
G’s mean productivity and less hiring from the group.
• Hypothesis 3. Through increased hiring, positive experiences increase learning
and lead to more accurate beliefs about group G’s productivity.
• Hypothesis 4. Through decreased hiring, negative experiences decrease learning
and lead to less accurate beliefs about group G’s productivity.
• Hypothesis 5. Since negative biases are more persistent than positive ones,
the final belief distribution about group G’s productivity is negatively-skewed
across employers.
3.3 Experimental Design
The experiment documents how an employer’s hiring experiences with group G




To construct a hiring pool for employers, workers were assigned the real-effort cogni-
tive task of solving character puzzles under a piece rate of 250 credits. An example
puzzle is shown in the Appendix B. Workers were given one practice puzzle followed
by 4 minutes to solve as many puzzles as they could, which corresponds to their
productivity in the experiment.
Based on the treatment, workers were randomly assigned to group Gray or Orange.6
The two groups are equally productive by construction, but differ in relative size
across employer treatment arms as described below.
3.3.2 Employers
Employers were incentivized with hiring the most productive workers over fifteen
periods t = 1, ..., 15, which corresponded to hiring from the worker group with higher
expected productivity, if any.7 They observed their hire’s productivity yit each period
and received 220 credits per puzzle solved by their hire for a total of 220yit, paid
for a random subset H of 5 periods. After the instructions, employers answered
comprehension questions to ensure a good understanding of the task.8
Before hiring, employers were informed about the worker task and shown an example
puzzle. They were given the following initial information: the size of the worker
groups and the mean productivity of group O, µ. When hiring from that group,
they were given a worker with productivity equal to the group average, yit = µ,
making concrete the idea that employers knew what to expect. Theoretically, this
simplification has no impact on employer behavior based on expected productivity.
6To control for preferences, colors green and purple were also used and color order was varied
such that some employers saw green or orange as the uncertain group and others purple or gray.
Little difference was found based on colors and they are pooled together.
7Chapter 4 reports that the median number of hires by managers at a large US retailer is 10
over a six year period, suggesting that fifteen hires corresponds to a substantial real world time
frame.
8Participants could attempt to answer the questions as many times as they wished within a one
hour period, but could not continue or receive payment without answering all questions correctly.
Some participants did not complete the questions and abandoned the experiment, likely improving
data quality.
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In practice, it simplifies the instructions substantially since the notion of averages
is easier to grasp than distributions, expectations, and dispersion. It is also of little
consequence for identifying the mechanism of interest, since I focus on the impact
of hiring experiences on subsequent hiring and beliefs, rather than baseline hiring
differentials across groups.9 To directly investigate the role of ambiguity aversion,
employers completed a separate task after their hiring task to obtain an individual
measure of ambiguity aversion following Gneezy et al. (2015).
Beliefs were elicited using a binarized scoring rule as proposed in Hossain and Okui
(2013) and incentivized for a random sample of two periods R.10 It was made ope-
rational as follows: when employers hired from group O, their beliefs about group G
carried over from the last period. Each period, current beliefs were used to compute
a squared prediction error (µ − µGjt)2. If the period was selected for payment, em-
ployers received 110 credits if their squared prediction error was below some number
Nt and nothing otherwise. Nt was drawn each period from a uniform distribution
on [0, 81], with the upper limit selected to have a high probability of being larger
than the squared prediction error under truthful reporting. Implicitly, employers le-
arned about both the mean and the variance of group G productivity, but the belief
elicitation mechanism isolates learning about the mean to focus on the impact of




t=11{t ∈ H}220yit + Σ15t=01{t ∈ R ∩ (µ− µGjt)2 < Nt}110.
3.3.3 Treatment Arms
To test hypotheses 1-5, employers were assigned to one of two treatments:
• Treatment B. Each period, employers choose between hiring from group O or
9The simplification gives risk-averse employers an incentive to hire from the certain group, but
does not interact with the nature of hiring experiences whose impact is the object of interest. That
is, the goal is not to document whether employers hire more or less workers from the uncertain
group, but whether better or worse hiring experiences with the group cause relative changes in
subsequent hiring and learning.
10The advantage over the quadratic scoring rule is that it does not require risk neutrality. It is
truth-inducing as long as agents prefer lotteries with higher probabilities of larger payments.
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G. Group O is framed as the majority group with 75% of workers. Beliefs
about the mean productivity of Group G are elicited before the first hire, after
every hire from the group, and at the end of the hiring task.
• Treatment C. As in Treatment B, but employers can only hire from Group G
each period.
Treatment B represents the baseline task, providing a setting to test hypotheses
1 and 2 by observing how hiring experiences impact subsequent hiring and beliefs
about group G’s productivity.
Testing hypotheses 3 and 4 is complicated by the fact that hiring experiences affect
posterior beliefs in two distinct ways: they mechanically lead to belief updating and
may also impact hiring, indirectly affecting beliefs. The first results from standard
belief updating, while the second corresponds to the mechanism of interest. For
example, contrast the difference in mean posterior beliefs about group G’s average
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To measure the total effect of a lower first signal, contrast the difference in mean
posterior beliefs between information sets S and S
′′




















Treatment C allows me to separately identify the two components by providing exo-
genous variation in beliefs that is uncorrelated with hiring experiences. For treatment
C, hires influence beliefs about the productivity of Group G, but endogenous learning
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is shut down since employers cannot stop hiring from the group. Since treatment B
employers generally hire from both groups regardless of their hiring experiences, I
use beliefs of employers assigned to treatment C after the number of periods corre-
sponding to the average number of G workers hired by treatment B when comparing
between the two treatments.11 Lastly, contrasting the final distributions of beliefs
across the two treatments also allows me to test hypothesis 5.
To further investigate how the hiring context affects the formation of biased beliefs
through endogenous employer learning about worker groups, I consider the following
additional treatments:
• Treatment B1. As in Treatment B, but groups are framed as equally sized with
50 workers each.
• Treatment B2. As in Treatment B, but beliefs about the mean productivity of
Group G are only elicited at the end of the hiring task.
Comparing Treatment B to Treatment B1 investigates how the framing of group
G as a minority impacts employer behavior and beliefs, since minority status is
a frequent feature of discrimination which may itself impact how employers form
beliefs. Comparing Treatment B to Treatment B2 investigates how belief elicitation
itself impacts behavior and beliefs. Belief elicitation incentives were chosen to be
small compared to hiring payoffs in order to minimize distortions in hiring incentives.
Still, eliciting beliefs could make employers more careful or suggest to them that their
beliefs should change. Table 3.2 summarizes the different treatments.
3.4 Data
A group of 200 workers and 869 employers were recruited through Amazon’s Mecha-
nical Turk (MTurk), using an exchange rate of 1000 credits for $0.2 and a subject
pool restricted to US adults.12 The experiment was implemented using oTree (Chen
11The main conclusions of the analysis are not sensitive to this choice of period.
12Data gathered through MTurk have been found to be reliable and consistent with data obtai-
ned from a traditional laboratory environment or other survey methods (Buhrmester et al., 2011;
Berinsky et al., 2012; Goodman et al., 2013; Bentley et al., 2017; Mortensen and Hughes, 2018).
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et al., 2016). Workers received a participation fee of $0.75 in addition to their ear-
nings, for an average total of $1.25. Their study lasted approximately 7 minutes,
corresponding to an hourly rate of around $10-$12. Summary statistics on workers
are presented in Table 3.1. They solved 9 puzzles on average, with a minimum of 1
and a maximum of 18.
Employers received a participation fee of $1 plus their earnings from the experiment,
for a total of approximately $3 on average. The study lasted around 12-15 minutes,
corresponding to an hourly rate of around $12-$15.13 The following sample restricti-
ons were applied. A subset of employers (approximately 8%) who only hired from
group O across all periods were excluded since they provide no usable variation.14
Employers who reported beliefs higher than the maximum number of puzzles solved
by workers (18) after the first hiring period were also excluded (approximately 2%)
to avoid extreme beliefs influencing the analysis. In total, based on power calcula-
tions from pilot experiments and after applying sample restrictions, 281 employers
were assigned to Treatment B, 139 to Treatment C, 182 to Treatment B1, and 185
to Treatment B2. Demographic information on employers is presented in Table 3.1.
Slightly more than half are male, three-quarters are white, two-thirds have a college
education, and three-quarters have some employment beyond MTurk.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
Hypotheses 1 and 2 posit that positive (negative) hiring experiences lead employers
to update their beliefs about group G’s mean productivity upwards (downwards), in-
creasing (decreasing) subsequent hiring of the group. I investigate this by estimating
the following models on Treatment B employers:
Yj,t+1 = β0 + β1Pjt + αj + εjt (3.1)
13Employers and workers were calibrated to earn the same hourly rate, but employers finished
the task quicker than expected on average. Employers and workers were not made aware of each
other’s earnings.
14These employers did not report substantially lower priors about group G productivity or hig-




F15j = β0 + β1Pjt + β2Xj + εjt (3.2)
where Yj,t+1 corresponds to whether the next hire is from group G or to beliefs about
group G’s mean productivity carried into the next period. F15j corresponds to the
total number of hires from group G or to beliefs about their mean productivity after
15 periods. Pjt measures the productivity of previous group G hires. I consider
several definitions, such as the mean productivity of group G workers over a range
of periods and indicators for hires with productivity below or above 9 (the mean
productivity of group O) in a subset of early periods. αj is a collection of employer
fixed effects included to capture time-invariant tendencies across employers to hire
from a given group or update their beliefs.15 Xj is an individual measure of ambiguity
aversion. Lastly, standard errors are clustered at the employer level for equation
(3.1).
Hypotheses 3 and 4 posit that positive (negative) hiring experiences increase (de-
crease) learning about group G by affecting hiring, leading to more (less) accurate
beliefs about the group’s productivity. The main outcome of interest is |µGtj − µ|,
a measure of biased beliefs about group G’s mean productivity. The experimental
data is used to estimate the following empirical model comparing treatments B and
C
|µGtj − µ| = β0 + β1Pjt + β2Bj + β3Pjt ∗Bj + εjt (3.3)
where Bj is an indicator for the employer having been assigned to treatment B. The
coefficient of interest, β3, represents the additional impact of hiring experiences for
employers who can hire from either group, isolating the mechanism of interest.




I provide evidence for hypotheses 1 and 2 in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Table 3.3 presents
estimates of equation (3.1) for Treatment B. Estimates regarding hiring correspond
to a 0.02 percentage point or 3% increase in the probability of hiring group G for each
additional puzzle solved by the previous G hire and a 24% decrease (21% increase) if
the previous worker was below (above) the mean Group O productivity of 9 puzzles.
Estimates regarding beliefs correspond to a 2% or 0.17 puzzle increase in beliefs about
the mean productivity of group G for each puzzle solved by the previous group G
hire and a 12% or 1 puzzle decrease (increase) if the previous worker was below
(above) the Group O average. Estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Experiences in the last period clearly influence current hiring and beliefs, and the
impact appears relatively symmetric for positive and negative experiences.
Employers switch between groups on average 3.86 times with a standard deviation
of 3.17. Still, 28% switch at most once and 43% switch at most twice, indicating
that a substantial fraction of employers were at or close to the optimal number.
Increased switching could mitigate the impact of the mechanism since employers do
not completely stop hiring group G workers after switching to group O once. Yet,
employers may be quicker to switch away from group G in the first place and since
the impact of early learning may be particularly important, this may in turn decrease
hiring and learning about group G.
Table 3.4 presents estimates of equation (3.2) for Treatment B. The impact of hiring
experiences on total hiring can be seen as a “first stage”, since the mechanism posits
that hiring experiences impact beliefs specifically though changes in hiring. Estima-
tes from the first three columns of the top panel show a strong statistically significant
relationship between total hires and the productivity of the first, the average of the
first three, and the average of all workers hired from group G (3%, 7% and 15% incre-
ases per additional puzzle solved).16 The first six columns of the bottom panel show
that early experiences with group G are an important determinant of total hiring
from the group. The first three columns show that hiring a first, first two, or first
16The sample size changes across columns since employers who stop hiring from group G after
their first (second) hire from the group are excluded when calculating the average of the first two
(three) hires.
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three workers below average productivity is associated with statistically significant
lower hiring of the group (26%, 27% and 30% decreases). Contrastingly, the impact
of positive early experiences progressively decreases from a 19% increase for the first
hire to a non-statistically significant 8% increase for the first three hires. Larger mag-
nitudes for negative experiences are expected because they lead to avoidance, while
positive experiences lead to more hiring which mitigates their impact on average.
Throughout, including the individual measure of ambiguity aversion has little im-
pact on the magnitude or statistical significance of the estimates of interest.
Columns 7-12 of Table 3.4 show a strong statistically significant relationship between
early hiring experiences and final beliefs about the group, but conflate the impact of
experiences on beliefs through hiring and mechanical belief updating. Estimates from
the top panel correspond to 1% , 5% and, 8% increases in final beliefs about group
G’s mean productivity for each additional puzzle solved by the first, the average of
the first three, and the average of all G workers. Estimates from Columns 7-9 of
the bottom panel grow larger with additional negative experiences, corresponding to
decreases of 8% , 14%, and 26% in final beliefs if the first, first two, and first three
hires from the group have below-mean productivity. The relationship with positive
early experiences is weaker, as expected, corresponding to 6-13% increases in final
beliefs. Overall, the evidence from Tables 3.3 and 3.4 strongly supports hypotheses
1 and 2.
Next, I provide evidence relating to hypotheses 3 and 4 shown in Table 3.5. First,
column 1 of the top panel provides evidence for Treatment B that each group G
hire decreases final bias by 5%. I then estimate equation (3.3) and present estimates
of the interaction term between hiring experiences and employers being assigned to
Treatment B. For Treatment C, beliefs after 9 periods are used to construct the
measure of final bias, since Treatment B employers hired 9 G workers on average.
Estimates from columns 2-4 of the top panel are statistically significant at the 5%
level and provide evidence that bias falls by 6%, 15% and 17% more for Treatment B
for a one puzzle increase in the productivity of the first, the average of the first three,
and the average of all group G hires. Estimates in columns 1-3 of the bottom panel
are statistically significant at the 5% level and correspond to additional increases
in bias of 55%, 59%, and 103% if the first, first two, and first three group G hires
have below-average productivity. Estimates in columns 4-6 regarding the impact of
42
positive experiences correspond to additional decreases in bias of 51%, 27%, and
20%, although only the estimate in column 4 is statistically significant. Additional
negative experiences have an increasing impact on bias for Treatment B, but the
effect of positive experiences is decreasing since they increase hiring and learning
so that both employer treatments observe a more similar number of signals. The
evidence provides direct support for hypotheses 3 and 4 at the core of the endogenous
bias-generating mechanism.
I provide evidence for hypothesis 5 in Figure 1, contrasting the change in the dis-
tribution of employer beliefs between Treatments B and C from the first period
of hiring to the last. Both treatments have slightly negatively-biased initial beliefs
about the mean productivity of group G, with an average of 8.6. Treatment C ge-
nerally corrected their biases, with both tails of the distribution shrinking, increased
mass around 9, and average beliefs of 9.05 after 15 periods. In contrast, Treatment
B have essentially the same average beliefs as in period 1. While the right tail of
the distribution shrunk, proportionally little changed in the left tail. The skewness
in the final belief distribution is -0.33 for Treatment B versus 0.08 for Treatment C,
and both Wilcoxon rank-sum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject the null hypot-
hesis of equal distributions at the 10% level. This highlights how employer beliefs
about group productivity may not converge or converge slowly with experience, when
experience is itself endogenous to an employer’s hiring history.
Table 3.6 contrasts the impact of hiring experiences on total hiring and final beliefs
between Treatments B, B1 and B2. Overall, although interaction terms are gene-
rally not statistically significant and negative experiences decrease hiring and beliefs
for both treatments, estimates fairly consistently suggest that the impact of nega-
tive experiences is larger when group G is framed as a minority, as indicated by the
positive interaction terms with Treatment B1 in columns 1-3 and 7-9 of the bottom
panel. Employers appear quicker to draw a conclusion regarding the relative pro-
ductivity of group G when it is presented as having relatively few workers, consistent
with stereotyping. Although interaction terms with treatment B2 are also generally
not statistically significant, estimates from columns 1-3 and 7-9 of the bottom panel
consistently suggest that the impact of negative experiences is larger when beliefs
are only elicited at the end. This is consistent with belief elicitation throughout the
hiring task making employers more careful in their evaluation of group G.
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3.6.1 Employer Characteristics
After the hiring task, employers completed an exit survey asking them some demo-
graphic information and their views on some race-related questions from the General
Social-Survey. Table 3.7 relates characteristics of employers to hiring of group G
and bias about their mean productivity. Participants with a higher measure of pre-
judice based on their average answer to six race-related questions hired 15% fewer
G workers when the group was presented as a minority.17 The estimated coefficient
is much smaller when groups were presented as equally-sized. In both cases, the
relationship with final beliefs appears negligible. The interaction between prejudice
and the nature of hiring experiences was also investigated, but revealed little beyond
an additional impact of positive experiences on future hiring for more prejudiced
employers. Overall, there is little evidence of systematic relationships between other
employer characteristics and hiring or bias.
3.6.2 Deviations from Bayesian Updating
The mechanism’s impact on hiring and beliefs in practice could be affected by stere-
otype formation (Allport, 1954) and the law of small numbers (Rabin, 2002), among
other factors (Kahneman, 2003).18 Another benefit of the experiment is therefore
quantifying the net impact of the mechanism, accounting for deviations from Baye-
sian updating.
The variance in group G productivity is unknown to employers, but their posterior
mean updating can suggests particular deviations from Bayesian updating. For every
round in which an employer reports their beliefs, I calculate their implied t = 0 para-
17Participants reported how much they agree (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly
Disagree) with the following statements. 1 - In general, African-Americans are as hard-working as
whites. 2 - In general, African-Americans are as competent at their job as whites. 3 - In general,
African-Americans are as intelligent as whites. 4 - You would object if a family member brought
an African-American friend home for dinner. 5 - There should be laws against marriages between
African-Americans and whites. 6 - You would vote for an African-American candidate for president
if they were qualified. African-Americans were asked to answer questions 4 and 6 replacing African-
American with white.
18Previous results in the literature indicate that the context can be an important determinant of
belief updating and lead to both under or over updating (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Grether,
1980; Mobius et al., 2014; Coutts, 2019; Enke and Zimmermann, 2019).
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meter κ0, which represents initial beliefs about variance in productivity of workers.
19
Under Bayesian updating, κ0 is a positive time-invariant constant, with a higher value
implying lower initial beliefs about variance and therefore more updating conditional
on a signal.
An increasing κ0 across periods suggests potential over-updating, consistent with
employers updating about the mean by more than implied from their initial beliefs
about the variance. κ0 can also be negative if posterior mean beliefs are above or
below both µ0 and x̄, or equal to infinity if employers do not update at all. More
precisely, a negative κ0 is consistent with over-updating when employers update
“too much” away from their prior towards x̄. For example, this arises if an employer
with prior beliefs of 9 observes signals of mean 8, but reports posterior beliefs of 7.
Alternatively, a negative κ0 is consistent with over-weighting of positive or negative
experiences, such that prior beliefs are closer to x̄ than posterior beliefs. For example,
this arises if an employer with prior beliefs of 9 observes signals of mean 8, but reports
posterior mean beliefs of 10.
Table 3.8 summarizes the implied values of κ0 across employers, separating negative
values based on whether they are consistent with over-updating or over-weighing. It
also investigates whether these values change with experience or the productivity of
the last group G worker hired. The table shows in columns 2-3 that the majority of
non-missing values for κ0 are negative, primarily consistent with over-updating rather
than over-weighting, and becoming more frequent with hiring experience. Restricting
to the subset of κ0 with positive values, column 1 indicates that the magnitude of
κ0 increases with hiring experience, also consistent with over-updating. Around 26%
of implied κ0 values are missing, presumably arising from most employers reporting
their beliefs as integers, and its frequency does not change with hiring experience
as indicated by column 4. Across columns, there is little evidence that updating
patterns vary with the productivity of the last hire. Overall, results are consistent
with stereotype formation, where employers over-estimate the homogeneity of group
G and update from relatively little information. This exacerbates the impact of
the bias-generating mechanism given the different impact of positive versus negative
19The conjugate prior of a normal distribution with unknown mean and variance is the normal-
gamma distribution. The closed form expression for the posterior mean corresponds to µn =
κ0µ0+nx̄
κ0+n
. From this expression, it is straightforward to recover the implied κ0, given that everything
else is observed.
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experiences on future hiring and learning.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that employers endogenously develop negatively-biased
beliefs about the productivity of a worker group about whose productivity they are
initially more uncertain through their hiring experiences with its workers. Employer
experiences with the group determine subsequent incentives to hire from the group
again and learn about their productivity. I find that employers reduce their hiring
of the group following negative experiences, decreasing their learning and leading
to negatively-biased beliefs. In contrast, positive biases are relatively temporary
since they endogenously lead to more hiring and learning. Across employers, since
negative biases are more persistent than positive ones, this leads to a negatively-
skewed distribution of beliefs.
I also show that the hiring context matters for the formation of biased beliefs. Na-
mely, whether a worker group is framed as a minority and whether employers are
primed to regularly report their beliefs both affect hiring and learning about group
G. Lastly, I provide evidence that employers in practice are quicker to form ne-
gative stereotypes about worker groups than a Bayesian benchmark, implying that
biased beliefs that arise through endogenous learning may be more pervasive than
predicted.
The paper studies a fundamental feature of hiring in labor markets: in many settings,
employers through their hiring learn not only about individual worker productivity,
but also that of their group. Learning about groups is seldom considered in models of
employer learning and discrimination, but I present evidence that it can play an im-
portant role in shaping employer behavior and worker outcomes. Importantly, biased
beliefs in this paper do not rely on prior bias, prejudice, or productivity differentials
across worker groups, providing evidence a new potential source of discrimination in
the labor market.
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See Table 3.2 for a description of treatment groups.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Puzzles Solved by Workers
Orange Gray
Mean 9.23 9.12




N. Obs. 150 50
P-value
H0: µO = µG 0.85








College Graduate 0.63 0.48
Employed Outside Mturk 0.73 0.45
N. Obs. 787
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Table 3.2: Employer Treatment Groups
N Hiring Minority Framing Belief Elicitation
Treatment B 281 Group G or O Group G Minority Prior, after every G hire, at the end
Treatment B1 182 Group G or O Equal Group Sizes Prior, after every G hire, at the end
Treatment B2 185 Group G or O Group G Minority At the end
Treatment C 139 Group G Group G Minority Prior, after every G hire, at the end
When Group G was framed as a minority group, it was presented as having 25% of workers
(50). When both groups were framed as equally sized, they were presented as having 50 workers
each.
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Table 3.3: Impact of Previous Gray Hire on Current Hiring and Beliefs, Treatment
B
Prob. of Hiring Gray Current Beliefs
Prev. Worker Prod. 0.020 0.172
(0.002) (0.011)
Prev. Worker > 9 0.124 1.038
(0.017) (0.068)
Prev. Worker < 9 -0.141 -1.001
(0.019) (0.070)
Outcome Mean 0.59 0.59 0.59 8.60 8.60 8.60
N. Obs. 2,306 2,306 2,306 2,465 2,465 2,465
Clustered standard errors at the employer level are presented in parentheses.
Regressions include employer fixed effects. Prev. Worker Prod. refers to the
productivity of the worker hired from group G last period. Prev. Worker > 9 (<
9) refers to whether the worker hired from group G last period had productivity
above (below) the mean productivity of group O, 9. The number of observations
differs across outcomes since a group G worker hired in period 15 leads to belief
updating but no further hiring. See Table 3.2 for a description of treatment
groups.
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Table 3.4: Impact of Hiring Experiences with Gray Workers on Hiring and Final
Beliefs, Treatment B
Total Gray Hires Final Beliefs
Worker #1 Prod. 0.277 0.088
(0.076) (0.034)
Worker #1-3 Avg. Prod. 0.659 0.409
(0.128) (0.068)
Worker Avg. Prod. 1.334 0.723
(0.145) (0.102)
Outcome Mean 8.77 9.72 8.77 8.60 8.76 8.60
N. Obs. 281 249 281 281 249 281
Worker #1 < 9 -2.248 -0.657
(0.532) (0.255)
Worker #1-2 < 9 -2.505 -1.225
(0.614) (0.341)
Worker #1-3 < 9 -2.939 -2.246
(0.963) (0.616)
Worker #1 > 9 1.672 0.516
(0.540) (0.253)
Worker #1-2 > 9 1.499 1.110
(0.588) (0.303)
Worker #1-3 > 9 0.770 1.097
(0.902) (0.461)
Outcome Mean 8.77 9.34 9.72 8.77 9.34 9.72 8.60 8.68 8.76 8.60 8.68 8.76
N. Obs. 281 262 249 281 262 249 281 262 249 281 262 249
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Regressions include an individual measure of ambiguity aversion
calculated as in Gneezy et al. (2015). Employers who stop hiring from group G after the first (two first) hire(s) are
excluded when calculating the average productivity of the first two (three) G workers because these employers have
less than two (three) total experiences with the group. See Table 3.2 for a description of treatment groups and Table
3.3 for definitions.
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Table 3.5: Differential Impact of Hiring Experiences with Gray Workers on Final
Bias, Treatment B versus C
Final Bias
Total Gray Hires -0.086
(0.019)
C*Worker #1 Prod. -0.082
(0.034)
C*Worker #1-3 Avg. Prod. -0.198
(0.068)
C*Worker Avg. Prod. -0.242
(0.121)
Outcome Mean 1.62 1.45 1.35 1.45
N. Obs. 281 420 388 420
C*Worker #1 < 9 0.798
(0.275)
C*Worker #1-2 < 9 0.810
(0.333)
C*Worker #1-3 < 9 1.416
(0.587)
C*Worker #1 > 9 -0.700
(0.283)
C*Worker #1-2 > 9 -0.365
(0.280)
C*Worker #1-3 > 9 -0.270
(0.378)
Outcome Mean 1.45 1.37 1.35 1.38 1.37 1.35
N. Obs. 420 401 388 420 401 388
Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Final bias is defined as the
absolute value of the difference between employer beliefs and the true mean
group productivity. Beliefs in period 9 are used to construct the bias measure
for Treatment C and beliefs in period 15 are used to construct the bias measure
for Treatment B. Treatment B employers who stop hiring from group G after
the first (two first) hire(s) are excluded when calculating the average producti-
vity of the first two (three) G workers because these employers have less than
two (three) total experiences with the group. See Table 3.2 for a description of
treatment groups and Table 3.3 for definitions.
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Table 3.6: Differential Impact of Hiring Experiences on Total Hiring and Final Be-
liefs, Treatments B versus Treatments B1 and B2
Total Gray Hires Final Beliefs
Worker 1 Prod. 0.279 0.091
(0.076) (0.034)
B1*Worker #1 Prod. -0.098 0.018
(0.109) (0.051)
B2*Worker #1 Prod. 0.148 0.277
(0.108) (0.200)
Worker #1-3 Prod. 0.659 0.410
(0.128) (0.069)
B1*Worker #1-3 Prod. -0.288 -0.169
(0.200) (0.105)
B2*Worker #1-3 Prod. 0.245 0.301
(0.187) (0.267)
Worker Avg. Prod. 1.336 0.726
(0.145) (0.102)
B1*Worker Avg. Prod. -0.282 0.072
(0.283) (0.147)
B2*Worker Avg. Prod. 0.015 0.153
(0.231) (0.153)
Outcome Mean 8.96 9.78 8.96 8.85 9.01 8.85
N. Obs. 648 584 648 648 584 648
Worker #1 < 9 -2.259 -0.676
(0.532) (0.256)
B1*Worker #1 < 9 0.428 0.152
(0.836) (0.389)
B2*Worker #1 < 9 -0.206 -1.361
(0.806) (1.069)
Worker #1-2 < 9 -2.490 -1.215
(0.611) (0.343)
B1*Worker #1-2 < 9 1.357 0.323
(0.991) (0.487)
B2*Worker #1-2 < 9 -0.367 -0.676
(0.937) (0.866)
Worker #1-3 < 9 -2.956 -2.260
(0.952) (0.624)
B1*Worker #1-3 < 9 1.733 0.467
(1.480) (0.737)
B2*Worker #1-3 < 9 -1.428 -0.585
(1.400) (1.059)
Worker #1 > 9 1.677 0.524
(0.540) (0.254)
B1*Worker #1 > 9 0.276 0.008
(0.821) (0.382)
B2*Worker #1 > 9 0.376 1.549
(0.810) (1.211)
Worker #1-2 > 9 1.491 1.105
(0.588) (0.302)
B1*Worker #1-2 > 9 -0.086 -0.549
(0.888) (0.483)
B2*Worker #1-2 > 9 1.587 1.261
(0.835) (2.258)
Worker #1-3 > 9 0.744 1.074
(0.905) (0.468)
B1*Worker #1-3 > 9 -0.653 -1.108
(1.187) (0.666)
B2*Worker #1-3 > 9 2.776 -1.068
(1.160) (0.897)
Outcome Mean 8.96 9.38 9.78 8.96 9.38 9.78 8.85 8.91 9.01 8.85 8.91 9.01
N. Obs. 648 615 584 648 615 584 648 615 584 648 615 584
Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. See Table 3.2 for a description of treatment groups and Table 3.3-3.4 for definitions.
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Table 3.7: Employer Characteristics, Hiring and Bias
Total Gray Hires Final Bias
Treatment B Treatment B1 Treatment B Treatment B1
Prejudice -1.308 -0.550 0.046 0.229
(0.423) (0.543) (0.119) (0.169)
Less than college -0.803 0.178 -0.058 -0.258
(0.773) (1.085) (0.245) (0.277)
Age 0.032 0.025 -0.002 0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.008) (0.010)
Male 0.196 0.220 -0.249 -0.247
(0.577) (0.650) (0.197) (0.204)
Employed -0.512 0.025 -0.013 -0.040
(0.594) (0.741) (0.213) (0.241)
Black -0.080 -1.649 0.685 0.040
(0.813) (1.213) (0.386) (0.295)
Hispanic 0.572 -2.812 0.351 0.033
(1.012) (1.309) (0.364) (0.385)
Outcome Mean 8.77 9.37 1.62 1.47
N. Obs. 281 182 281 182
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Prejudice refers to an index
measure based on average responses to six race-related questions adapted from the
General Social Survey. Employed is an indicator variable for whether the participant
is employed beyond their work on Mechanical Turk. See Table 3.2 for a description
of treatment groups and Table 3.5 for definitions.
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Table 3.8: Departures from Bayesian Updating, Treatment B
κ0 >0 κ0 <0
κ0 Over-Updating Over-Weighing Prob. κ0 Missing
Number of Hires 0.470 0.035 0.010 0.002
(0.115) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Worker Prod. 0.024 0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.046) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Mean 3.212 0.389 0.100 0.260
N. Obs. 675 1,814 1,814 2,465
Clustered standard errors at the employer level are presented in parentheses. Re-




The Emergence of Hiring Discrimination
joint work with Alan Benson
4.1 Introduction
A substantial body of research has examined the extensive and persistent racial
disparities in the labor market, particularly studying the root causes of employment
discrimination which is essential to develop theory, interpret evidence, and design
policy interventions (Lang and Lehmann, 2012). One prominent strain of recent
research has studied how idiosyncratic, biased beliefs among individual employers,
judges, and other influential decision-makers can be enormously consequential in
creating outcome differentials across groups (Reuben et al., 2014; Arnold et al.,
2018; Bohren et al., 2019a; 2019b; Bordalo et al., 2019; Sarsons, 2019).
But why are the beliefs of managers and other decision makers biased? Previous
work has proposed that biases may arise from implicit group associations (Bertrand
et al., 2005) or the exaggeration of small differences in true group means (Bordalo
et al., 2016). Chapter II proposes that such biases may also arise through market
interactions with groups. If managers update their beliefs based on their previous
experiences with a group, then these experiences also shape subsequent incentives to
hire from the group and learn more about its workers. For example, early negative
experiences may prompt managers to avoid hiring members of a certain group, which
may itself slow learning. However, data limitations have stymied efforts to study the
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emergence of individuals’ biased beliefs and discriminatory hiring in labor markets
(Charles and Guryan, 2011; Guryan and Charles, 2013). For instance, Census and
audit study data that have been workhorses of discrimination research rarely feature
data on individual hiring managers or hiring within managers over time, inhibiting
researchers’ ability to study the emergence of biases.
In this paper, we use administrative data from the US operations of a large national
retailer to examine how managers’ past experience hiring workers of different races
affects the race of their subsequent hires. The data, which include over 1 million
permanent workers working under 27,000 department store managers across 4,900
stores between 2009 and 2016, are particularly well suited to study the evolution
of manager-level hiring discrimination: hiring is highly decentralized and at the
discretion of department managers, who are incentivized to hire a productive team
and free to use any information gleaned from interviews or past experience to make
decisions. The data afford relatively high power to study the evolution of hiring
across a large set of managers; about half a percent of the stock of the US labor force
was hired by the firm in this period. Workers in the retail-trade sector constitute
about 10% of the US labor force and share similar barriers to economic mobility as
other working class occupations (BLS, 2021).
We begin by establishing substantial cross-manager heterogeneity in black hires,
even after controlling for manager race, store, department, and job effects. Exa-
mining managers who move across stores, we find that a substantial share of the
residual variation in black hiring is explained by manager fixed effects, implying that
individual manager idiosyncrasies play a substantial role in determining the race of
hires.
To examine whether variation in the race of hires across managers can be explained
by biased beliefs seeded from their previous hiring experiences, we begin from a
theoretical framework adapted from Chapter II. Managers are initially uncertain
about differences in performance among applicants of different groups (e.g. white
and black), but update their beliefs as they hire workers. Because hiring is based on
managers’ beliefs, and those beliefs also depend on hiring, learning is endogenous.
Learning is also asymmetric: positive hiring experiences with a worker group lead
managers to update their beliefs of that group’s performance distribution upward,
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increasing their propensity to hire from that group. In contrast, negative experiences
discourage future hiring, which also slows learning. Therefore, positive biases self-
correct more quickly than negative ones. The model also yields the prediction that
managers update their beliefs more following experiences with minority groups with
whom they have less experience.1 Combined with the relative persistence of negative
biases, this systematically decreases the hiring of minority workers.
To operationalize positive and negative hiring experiences, we use dismissal and quit
rates among workers hired for permanent positions. Turnover at this firm (and in
retail generally) is very high, as are the cumulative costs of recruiting, training,
and ramping up new workers. We define a positive experience hiring a worker of a
given race as a spell in which turnover for that race is lower than expected given
observable worker and job characteristics. We define negative experiences as higher-
than-expected turnover. Our main results follow.
First, positive past experiences with white or black workers increase a manager’s
propensity to hire from that group, whereas negative experiences decrease their pr-
opensity. This result is consistent with the proposition that managers update their
beliefs based on their personal experiences on the job, and not with the proposition
that discriminatory beliefs and behaviors are stationary or “fixed” by the time they
become managers.
Second, we find that learning is asymmetric by race. Although past experience
affects subsequent hiring for both black and white workers, the effect is particularly
pronounced for black workers. This suggests that managers have relatively weak
priors about minority groups, and as a result, similar information yields greater
changes in beliefs.
Third, early negative hiring experiences lead to a substantial persistent decline in
black hiring; the effects of early experiences with white workers or early positive expe-
riences with black workers are comparatively small and short-lived. The importance
of early negative experiences with black workers suggests that the initial “seeding”
of hiring experiences with minorities can have substantial, persistent effects on the
1The idea that employers have noisier information about minority workers is consistent with
previous work in statistical discrimination (Lundberg and Startz, 1983; Lang, 1986; Cornell and
Welch, 1996; Morgan and Várdy, 2009), but we explicitly consider the dynamic implications of
noisier information for subsequent hiring and learning.
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bias and hiring of individual managers.
We investigate several potential mechanisms through which managers’ hiring his-
tories could affect subsequent hiring, including supply-side responses by workers,
hiring through referrals, and selection on unobservables. We conclude that these al-
ternative mechanisms are unlikely to explain our findings. Rather, our set of results
are most consistent with the proposition that managers update their beliefs about
groups based on their own personal experiences, which in turn affects their future
hiring.
These results have several implications for the study of discrimination. First, we
provide evidence that race is a salient worker characteristic to managers and biased
hiring occurs at the level of the manager based on their personal past experience on
the job. Beliefs are not static, they are not purely determined at the level of the
firm, and not fully checked by firm-level learning or signals provided by algorithmic
recommendations and interviews. In contrast, much of the existing work focuses on
time-invariant firm or manager effects, sometimes explained by variation in manager
race (Giuliano et al., 2009; Giuliano and Ransom, 2013; Benson, Board and Meyer-
ter-Vehn, 2019),2 or implicit bias (Glover et al., 2017). Second, we provide evidence
that hiring and learning are endogenously driven by managers’ personal experiences
with worker groups, therefore learning can be particularly slow for managers who
have relatively little experience hiring minorities. Although we focus on hiring, this
could presumably be extended to wages, as conventionally studied in employer lear-
ning models (e.g. Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Lange, 2007;
Arcidiacono et al. 2010; Kahn and Lange, 2014; Lesner, 2018).
More generally, the endogenous formation of biased beliefs among employers and
other economic gatekeepers is absent from much of the discrimination literature. We
provide rare evidence consistent with fairly persistent biased beliefs in a broadly re-
presentative labor market setting and more particularly with endogenous learning
about worker groups generating biased beliefs and discrimination. Making the dis-
tinction between endogenous biased beliefs and standard theories of statistical dis-
crimination (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Aigner and Cain, 1977; Coate and Loury,
2Focusing on differences across manager racial groups can complicate interpretation, since they
likely differ across unobservable characteristics which affect relative hiring, such as access to a
network of workers from their own racial group.
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1993), in which discrimination arises as a response of employers to true group diffe-
rences, or taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957), is crucial because they can lead
to very different conclusions about how discrimination arises and can be mitigated.
Our findings highlight that, even if employer beliefs about worker groups eventually
converge with experience, algorithmic decision-making, or market competition, they
do so slowly and unevenly across groups in a manner that can create discrimination.
They also suggest that theories of statistical discrimination that allow for biased
employer beliefs may capture important aspects of discrimination and help explain
its pervasiveness and persistence.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
We present a model adapting Chapter II in which managers iteratively update their
beliefs about the productivity of worker groups based on the observed productivity of
their hires, and hire based on their (endogenous) beliefs. The main difference with the
model in Chapter II is that we consider individual hiring decisions of managers who
hire from an exogenous set of applicants for a given position. Our exposition considers
managers who condition beliefs on race, but in principle, the model could be applied
to any group characteristic, such as gender, education, or personality. Moreover,
although managers in the model update their beliefs about the general productivity
of black and white workers, we emphasize that managers may be only updating their
beliefs as though past experiences are indicative of the potential quality of hires
given their location or job. Although it’s unclear whether managers generalize their
experiences to the full universe of people of a given group, our empirics suggest that
managers perceive their prior experiences as informative at least within the same
parent company.
Our primary proposition is that employer beliefs about a worker group’s productivity
become biased because they depend on observed hires which themselves depend on
beliefs. Managers “learn” from a biased sample of worker productivity, and this bias
is seeded by good or bad previous experiences with workers from the group. Mo-
reover, if managers have noisier information on the productivity of minority groups
(Lundberg and Startz, 1983; Lang, 1986; Cornell and Welch, 1996; Morgan and
60
Várdy, 2009), then experiences with these workers play a disproportionate role in
shaping subsequent hiring. The key novel predictions of our framework are as fol-
lows. First, negative hiring experiences decrease subsequent hiring of that group, and
positive experiences increase subsequent hiring. Second, because the rate of hiring
drives the speed of learning, negative biases will be more persistent than positive
ones. Third, persistent negative biases from hiring experiences disproportionately
impact workers from minority groups, both because managers come in with weak
priors and because the rate at which minorities are hired is naturally low. These
predictions do not rely on biased updating or on different worker groups having dif-
ferent productivity distributions: whatever the true productivity of minority groups
is, employers will underestimate it.
As in standard models of statistical discrimination, managers hire workers based on
their expected productivity and, in the absence of perfect information on individuals
at the hiring stage, use group membership as a potentially relevant indicator of
individual productivity. Unlike standard models of statistical discrimination, we do
not assume that employers have complete information on group productivity or that
their beliefs are confirmed in equilibrium, for example through endogenous worker
responses. Rather, employers are initially uncertain about the relative productivity
of groups and update their beliefs through hiring.3
Specifically, a manager is tasked with hiring the most productive worker from a
candidate pool, taking vacancies and entry wages for a position as given. Managers
predict the productivity of worker i from group g, xig, based on a noisy signal of
individual productivity sig, which they observe prior to hiring, and group membership
g. The individual signal is composed of the worker’s productivity and an unbiased
noise component, such that sig = xig + εig with εig ∼ N(0, σ2εg). For example, it
could include information from a candidate’s resume, a pre-employment test, or an
interview.
We consider two worker groups denoted by W and B. Worker productivity is nor-
3This type of discrimination is fundamentally from taste-based discrimination. While both
generate outcome differentials that are not grounded in true group differentials, discrimination in
our model arises from biased beliefs about productivity caused by a lack or information or learning,
rather than a fundamental prejudice. Taste-based discrimination should not systematically respond
to changing beliefs about the productivity of groups, leading to different dynamics and policy
implications.
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mally distributed with mean µg and variance σ
2
g , such that xig ∼ N(µg, σ2g). The
productivity distributions of groups are static, but beliefs about these distributions
are heterogeneous and evolve over time. For expositional simplicity, we assume that
managers know the variance in group productivity σ2g and the noisiness of individual
signals σ2εg for g ∈ {W,B}, which both potentially vary across groups.4 As such, we
focus on posterior beliefs about the mean productivity of group g, µ̂g, and define
Sgmt = {xign : i from g is hired by m at time n}tn=1 as the information set about
workers from group g available to manager m at time t.
The expected productivity of worker i from group g for manager m at time t is




.5 The manager hires the worker with the highest
expected productivity out of the set of applicants At, with fraction Fgt from group
g.6 That is, worker i from group g is hired at time t if Pigmt > Pi′g′mt for all i
′ ∈ At
from group g′, and for g′ ∈ {W,B}.
When manager m begins hiring, they have a prior belief distribution about group
g’s mean productivity µ̂g|Sgm0. If they don’t hire from group g at time t, they don’t
update their beliefs and µ̂g|Sgm,t−1
d
= µ̂g|Sgmt.7 If they hire from group g at time t,
managers observe their hire’s productivity xig, which is not randomly drawn because
managers select workers based on expected productivity.
Accordingly, managers first form an expectation about xig given that worker i has
4Employers learning about productivity variance or individual signal precision through their
experiences would affect the relative weight attached to individual signals versus group members-
hip across worker groups, but not the substantive implication that positive (negative) experiences
increase (decrease) a group’s expected productivity, and therefore the probability of hiring from the
group.
5Employers know σ2g for a given mean, but uncertainty about the mean introduces additional
variance in expected productivity V ar[µ̂g|Sgm,t−1].
6As modeled in Chapter II, managers should also value learning about groups to improve subse-
quent hiring. We abstract from this feature since it does not change the direction of belief updating
and that of its impact on hiring and learning across groups.
7We assume that information from a manager’s own hire is particularly salient compared to
signals of workers not hired or correlated updating across groups, abstracting from these sources of
updating for shorter-run hiring decisions.
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the highest expected productivity out of all applicants, given by
E[xig|Pigmt > Pi′g′mt ∀i′ ∈ At, g′ ∈ {W,B}].
Second, managers update their beliefs from µ̂g|Sgm,t−1 to µ̂g|Sgmt. Posterior variance
monotonically decreases with additional hires, while the direction of posterior mean
updating depends on the discrepancy between expected and observed productivity
of the hire
E[xig|Pigmt > Pi′g′mt ∀i′ ∈ At, g′ ∈ {W,B}]− xig. (4.1)
If realized productivity is above or below expectation, denoted as a positive and nega-
tive hiring experience respectively, managers update their beliefs based on equation
(4.1) with upwards updating when the difference is negative and downwards upda-
ting otherwise. A positive (negative) experience with group g increases (decreases)
E[µ̂g|Sgmt] and Pigm,t+1 relative to group g′, increasing (decreasing) the probability
that a group g worker is hired in period t + 1. In our data, we have performance
measures but not whether they were above or below the manager’s expectation, so
we use different performance measures relative to other workers at the firm, which
should inform expectations. These predictions don’t rely on prior bias or prejudice
and don’t depend on Bayesian updating, potentially including a wide class of belief
updating rules. The subjective assessment of an employer as to what constitutes
a positive or negative experience may itself be biased and vary across groups, but
it is precisely the manager’s perception that is of interest, rather than the worker’s
objective performance.8
Contrasting the impact of positive and negative hiring experiences, a positive ex-
perience, through increasing the probability of subsequent hiring from the group,
also increases the probability of observing signals about the group’s productivity at
time t + 1 and beyond. Depending on the manager’s prior, these additional signals
may partially undo the impact of the positive experience through reversion to the
8While evidence on the impact of experiences with workers more likely to have been exoge-
nously assigned to managers is presented in Appendix C, we purposefully focus on a manager’s own
endogenous hiring decisions since they are likely more salient to the manager and more likely to
lead to updating about worker groups given that the manager should have a clearer expectation of
performance from being in charge of assessing and selecting workers.
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mean and lead to more accurate beliefs. In contrast, a negative experience, through
decreasing the probability of subsequent hiring from the group, also decreases the
probability of observing signals about the group’s productivity at time t + 1 and
beyond. Regardless of prior beliefs, the impact may be more persistent, because it
decreases learning. The relative size of worker groups may also interact with these
impacts. If Fg is small, workers from the group are infrequently hired. Belief up-
dating from experience is less likely to be pivotal for subsequent hiring, but may
have more persistent impacts since learning is slower. Similarly, it may be easier
(harder) for managers to avoid hiring (seek out) groups who constitute a minority
of applicants following negative (positive) experiences.
Lastly, belief updating across groups may differ based on differences in employer
priors, worker productivity distributions, and group size. Managers may have higher
prior precision about group W ’s productivity because they are the majority group
or because they are themselves primarily from group W . Similarly, if there are fewer
workers from group B, managers should update more about the group given equi-
valent signals. Differential updating across groups, combined with more persistent
impacts of negative experiences on subsequent hiring, predicts that hiring experiences
systematically decrease relative group B hiring across managers.
To summarize, three main predictions follow from the theoretical framework:
• 1. More negative (positive) hiring experiences of a manager with workers of a
given group decrease (increase) the manager’s subsequent hiring of the group.
• 2. Negative experiences have more persistent impacts, because they decrease
subsequent learning about the group’s productivity.
• 3. Experiences of a manager with groups disproportionately affect minority
hiring.
4.3 Data, Hiring, and Empirical Design
Our data consist of longitudinal administrative records on workers and managers
from the US operations of a large national retailer between February 2009 and Oc-
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tober 2016. For each worker and manager, we observe tenure, demographics, job,
department, and location. We also observe employment termination including dis-
missals, quits, and layoffs along with stated reasons for dismissals and quits. Each
store is led by one store manager and a set of department managers who hire for
their respective department, allowing us to study hiring decisions of each department
manager over time. We restrict our sample to workers hired into permanent positi-
ons, as these are presumably the most consequential for the manager and positions
for which tenure can be used as a measure of the worker’s performance (Autor and
Scarborough, 2008). We focus on white and black workers because these are the two
largest racial categories in our data, which make it most feasible to estimate mana-
gers’ evolving hiring behavior. Hispanics are treated as a separate category in the
data and are presented in Appendix C. Summary statistics on workers and managers
are presented in Table 4.1.
When a department has a vacant position, managers have access to a pool of existing
applicants and can post to recruit additional candidates. Applicants take an online
screening test that classifies them into three recommendation tiers. Department
managers observe screening test results, but are free to deviate from the algorithmic
recommendation when selecting applicants to interview. Department managers are
trained in behavioral interview techniques. For instance, a customer service applicant
may be asked how they might respond to a hypothetical scenario, like dealing with
a difficult customer, or to discuss an instance they confronted a problem and were
proud of the solution they offered. New hires complete one week of online training
and one week of shadowing an experienced worker before starting in their regular
position.
4.3.1 Characterizing Black Hiring Across Managers
We begin by characterizing heterogeneity in the hiring of black workers across mana-
gers and examining how much of it is due to idiosyncratic variation across individual
managers versus external factors. Although descriptive, this type of decomposition
can rarely be done due to data requirements and is valuable because theories of dis-
crimination differ fundamentally in the predicted role of individual managers. Under
classical statistical discrimination, managers discriminate similarly around the true
65
productivity distribution of each group; they are not individually and idiosyncrati-
cally biased. In stark contrast, idiosyncratic prejudice or bias are at the center of
taste-based and belief-based discrimination.
Figure 4.1 shows the share of black and white workers hired over our sample by each
manager. There is substantial heterogeneity in group hiring across managers. The
mean share of black workers hired by managers is 20%, the median is 8%, and more
than a quarter hire no black workers. The mean share of white workers hired is 56%
and the median is 59%.
Many factors presumably contribute to heterogeneity in hiring across worker groups,
such as store location. To estimate how much heterogeneity in black hiring is ex-
plained by manager effects net of other factors that may vary by store, department,
job, time period, or economic condition, we take Abowd et al. (1999)’s approach
of analyzing connected sets of workers, specifically managers who work in multiple
stores.9 Over a quarter of managers hire in more than one store, around 8% hire in
more than 2 stores, and the majority of managers hire for multiple job types, gene-
rating substantial variation to separately identify manager fixed effects. Indeed, the
largest connected set of managers and stores covers over 90% of new workers hired
at the firm during our sample period.
We implement this approach using a linear probability model of the form
Blackimjlt =Xmjltβ + γm + αj + λl + θt + εimjlt (4.2)
where the dependent variable indicates that worker i hired by manager m for job
j in location l at time t is black. Xmjlt includes whether the worker was hired for
a part-time or full-time job, the manager’s cumulative number of hires, the yearly
state unemployment rate, and the fraction of the state population with at least some
college education. γm, αj, λl, and θt correspond to manager, job, store, and month
and year fixed effects.10 We compute the predicted value for each individual hire and
average predicted values at the manager level to obtain the predicted share of black
hires for each manager. This procedure yields higher predicted shares for managers
9Several recent papers have also applied this approach to estimate manager fixed effects net of
sets of highly correlated covariates e.g. Lazear et al. (2015) and Benson et al. (2019).
10The results are similar when including department fixed effects as well as worker demographics
including age and gender.
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recruiting in jobs, locations, periods, and market conditions associated with more
black hires.
Figure 4.2 contrasts the predicted black hiring shares across managers to the actual
values. By construction, predicted shares approximate the middle of the distribution.
Especially without manager fixed effects, they fail to capture much of the bottom
of the distribution, predicting that too many managers hire 10-30% black workers
and too few hire less. Beyond manager fixed effects, the majority of the explanatory
power comes from the store fixed effects, which capture store-level and area-level cha-
racteristics. Without manager fixed effects, the adjusted R-squared with store fixed
effects alone is approximately 0.285, while that of the full model is approximately
0.3. Manager fixed effects alone explain 4-5% of the total variation in black hiring
and roughly a third of the discrepancy between actual shares and those predicted
by the model without manager fixed effects. Qualitatively, the model with manager
fixed effects still under-predicts the share of managers who hire very few or no black
workers, but the discrepancy is substantively smaller. This exercise suggests that,
beyond store and contextual factors, the specific identify of the hiring manager is an
important predictor of black hiring in a department. Appendix C presents results
restricted to managers who hire at least 5 workers over our sample period, which has
little substantive impact on the results, and analogous results for white hiring.
The distribution of manager fixed effects is plotted in Figure 4.3, with the right
panel restricted to managers who hire at least 5 workers. To adjust the estimated
fixed effects based on their precision from the total number of hires by each mana-
ger, we apply an empirical Bayes shrinkage procedure, although its impact on the
estimates is negligible (Morris, 1983; Guarino et al., 2015). The distribution in the
left panel appears fairly symmetric, while that in the right panel displays a slight
negative skew. As shown in Appendix C, the analogous distribution for white wor-
kers exhibits a slight positive skew. Simple correlation analyses indicate that the
fixed effects for black hiring are negatively correlated with turnover of black workers,
suggesting that they capture something concrete about the ability or willingness
of managers to successfully hire and manage these workers. In contrast, there is
little correlation between the fixed effects and the state-level prejudice measure from
Stephens-Davidowitz (2014) after controlling for the fraction of black population in
the Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA).
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4.3.2 Empirical Design
We next turn to our main empirical analysis regarding how managers’ experiences
with black and white workers shape their subsequent hiring behavior. We organize
the data into a manager-level panel with each observation corresponding to a month
in which a manager hires at least one black or white worker, which we refer to as
a hiring event. Our baseline analysis restricts our sample to managers who began
hiring at the firm for the first time during our sample period. On average, managers
hire workers approximately every two and a half months, totaling 60,096 hiring events
(46% of all manager-months) with an average of 2.3 workers per hiring event (0.75
black, 1.55 white).
Our main specification investigates how hiring experiences with black and white
workers in previous hiring events influence relative hiring in the current hiring event.
We estimate the following model
Fgemlt =β1 ¯EXP g,e−1 + β2 ¯EXP g′,e−1 +Xgemltζ + θt + λl + γm + εgemlt (4.3)
where the dependent variable is the share of group g workers hired in hiring event
e by manager m in location l at time t, corresponding to the share of black hires in
our main analysis. The primary coefficient of interest is β1, capturing the impact
of more positive or negative average hiring experiences with black workers up to
hiring event e− 1. Similarly, ¯EXP g′,e−1 captures more positive or negative average
hiring experiences with group g′ up to hiring event e − 1, corresponding to hiring
experiences with white workers in our main analysis. Xgemlt includes the fraction
of full-time workers, fraction female, average age, total number of hires, number of
previous hiring events, time since last hiring event, yearly state unemployment, and
yearly state college attainment. θt, λl, and γm represent month and year, store, and
manager fixed effects. Store fixed effects account for differences between applicant
pools, local markets, and store-level characteristics faced by the manager, among
other factors. Manager fixed effects account for fundamental manager differences,
for example in ability hiring and managing different worker groups or in taste-based
discrimination. Standard errors are clustered at the manager level.
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This specification can be used to test our theoretical framework’s three key predicti-
ons by considering different measures for ¯EXP g,e−1 and ¯EXP g′,e−1. First, the impact
of the cumulative average experience with a worker race in previous hiring events on
current hiring of the race provides evidence for prediction 1, that is whether more
negative (positive) experiences of a manager with a race impact their subsequent
hiring of the race. Second, considering average experience over a subset of early
hiring events investigates the (relative) persistence of different hiring experiences on
subsequent hiring, which we posit operates by endogenously affecting employer lear-
ning about the racial group’s performance. Third, comparing the impact of previous
hiring experiences with black and white workers on subsequent relative hiring inves-
tigates whether previous experiences have larger impacts on minority hiring.
Our empirical analysis considers hiring decisions as a function of idiosyncratically
positive or negative experiences given the true expected mean of each race. This
requires us to distinguish each hiring event as either positive or negative versus ex-
pectations for both worker races. To calculate idiosyncratic, manager-level deviations
in observed experience versus expectation, we first compute deviations in monthly
turnover rates by race at the level of the manager’s subordinates from expected
turnover rates at the firm.11 The cumulative average of these monthly deviations in-
dicates how previous hires from each racial group were more or less likely to achieve
a given tenure than expected.
We also consider a second approach separating particularly negative and positive
experiences of a manager, focusing on specific experiences likely to be most salient to
the manager. For negative experiences, for each hiring event, we calculate the share
of each race that was fired or quit in the first 3 months of employment. Workers
hired into permanent positions who leave or are terminated within the first 3 months
account for around a quarter of hires and they are costly in terms of direct costs
of hiring and training, foregone on-the-job skills training and ramp up period of a
potentially successful hire, and low productivity. For positive experiences, for each
hiring event, we calculate the share of each race that achieves tenure of at least one
year in their job during our sample period, accounting for around 10% of hires. Long
tenure suggests a successful hire and sufficiently good match between the worker
11Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar comparing to race-specific turnover rates or
aggregate turnover rates.
69
and the position. Given the potentially forward-looking nature of these measures,
we exclude workers hired in the last 3 months (1 year) of our sample for negative
(positive) experiences. Appendix C describes other features of workers associated
with having a good or bad experience. The latter are never promoted in our sample,
they have lower sales performance for subsets of workers for whom this information
is available, and they are more likely to abandon their job without warning which is
particularly costly for the firm, be terminated for unsatisfactory performance, and
never get past the probation stage. In contrast, the former are more likely to leave
for career advancement, studies, or personal reasons.
Summary statistics for performance measures are shown in the bottom panel of Table
4.1. Black hires have a higher probability of being terminated within 3 months,
slightly lower probability of quitting within 3 months, and slightly lower probability
of achieving at least one year of tenure. These differentials could indicate a lower
average performance of black workers at the firm, but they are also endogenous
to potential biases and discrimination. In any case, our theoretical framework’s
main predictions do not depend on true group productivity, but rather the difference
between expected and realized performance for each race, both of which may be
subjectively assessed.12
4.4 Results
Table 4.2 shows that a manager’s previous experiences hiring worker groups have
a clear impact on current hiring decisions. The outcome variable corresponds to
the share of hires that are black, but since the sample is restricted to black and
white workers, estimates for the fraction of white hires are the same magnitude but
opposite sign. The independent variables capture the cumulative impact of previous
experiences with each race and are better interpreted for a one standard deviation
change than for extreme outcomes of 0 or 1. Estimated impacts in percentages
are proportionally larger for black than white hiring given that they constitute a
minority of workers, approximately 50% larger, indicating that hiring experiences
12If managers expect to fire black workers more often, then they may update less following such
an event. In contrast, our empirical results indicate more updating, consistent with differential
updating as discussed in our theoretical framework.
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play a disproportionately large role in black hiring.
The first panel presents results for the cumulative measure of expected tenure by
race, with more negative (positive) experiences resulting in a more negative (positive)
measure of deviation from expected tenure and a higher (lower) hazard rate for a
given tenure. The results show that a higher expected tenure for black workers
based on previous experiences leads to statistically significantly more hiring of these
workers, with a one standard deviation increase corresponding to an increase of 3-
5% in the relative hiring of black workers. Columns 3-5 consider different samples
which yield similar conclusions, focusing on the hiring of female workers, hiring
by white managers only, and all hiring spells without restricting to new managers.
The estimates for expected tenure with white workers are substantively smaller, not
statistically significant, and tests reject the null that they are of equal magnitude
but opposite sign to that of black workers.
The middle panel presents the results of negative experiences specifically. They in-
dicate that managers decrease their hiring of black workers by around 6% for a one
standard deviation increase in the fraction of previous black hires that were dismis-
sed or quit within 3 months. Estimates across columns suggest that these impacts
affect the hiring of both men and women, are not restricted to white managers, and
are not simply driven by new managers. Across columns, estimates are statistically
significant at the 5% level. Estimated impacts for experiences with white workers
indicate a substantially smaller increase of approximately 2-3% in black hiring when
accounting for the higher standard deviation of experience measures with black wor-
kers. Statistical tests reject the null that impacts with black and white workers
are equal but of opposite sign for the baseline sample as well as that restricted to
white managers, while differences are smaller for female workers and hires by more
experienced managers. One possible explanation for larger responses following expe-
riences with black hires is that proportionally more separations with black workers
indicate dismissals rather than quits, but Appendix C shows that discrepancy in re-
sponse is no smaller for quits. Moreover, there is a similar discrepancy in responses
across groups following positive experiences, as we discuss next.
The bottom panel of Table 4.2 presents estimates of the impact of positive previ-
ous experiences. Managers statistically significantly increase their hiring of black
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workers by approximately 3-4% for a one standard-deviation increase in the fraction
of previous black hires who reached at least one year of tenure in their position.
Estimated impacts of experiences with white workers are smaller and statistically
non-significant. Across panels and specifications, estimates suggest that cumulative
previous experiences, particularly with black workers, have a substantial impact on
subsequent hiring decisions, with some evidence that the discrepancy is smaller for
female workers, little evidence that this is restricted to white managers, and evi-
dence that these impacts do not only affect hiring decisions of new managers at the
firm.
Negative experiences appear to have a larger impact than positive ones. There are
several potential explanations for this, perhaps the most straightforward being diffe-
rences in the performance measures.13 A relatively quick dismissal or quit indicates
a bad enough match that the employment relationship ended, while a worker re-
maining in their position only indicates sufficient performance and match quality to
avoid separation. Other potential factors include turnover costs, risk aversion, and
managers being more inclined to explain a negative outcome using external factors
(the performance of a worker group) than their own performance. Still, the key take-
away is that both positive and negative experiences with groups, particularly black
workers, impact hiring.
Appendix C presents additional results showing that both quits and fires have a ne-
gative impact on subsequent hiring, consistent with managers aiming to avoid both
(Autor and Scarborough, 2008), that considering the performance of black hires re-
lative to white hires or workers in the CBSA has limited impact on the results, and
that there is a larger impact in areas with a larger black population, as predicted by
the theoretical framework since belief updating is more likely to be pivotal in subse-
quent hiring decisions. Additional results also suggest that negative experiences with
black workers carry over when a manager transfers stores, that negative experiences
with black workers inherited by a new manager decreases hiring of the group by the
manager, and that negative experiences which are less likely to be endogenous to a
manager’s behavior also decrease hiring.14 Lastly, the cumulative average experiences
13We investigated other measures of positive experiences including promotions, salary and addi-
tional work hours. Promotions within the first months of employment are very rare, salaries are
generally fixed, and additional hours primarily reflect demand fluctuations.
14These include dissatisfaction with pay, compensation or benefits, which are not controlled by
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of other managers at the same store have little impact on a manager’s own hiring de-
cisions after accounting for the manager’s own experiences. Managers learning from
other managers could mitigate biases arising from a manager’s own experiences. Yet,
even in a setting where this type of information is relatively observable, informative
given the similarity in employment contexts, and in which managers have incentives
to cooperate given store-level bonuses, hiring decisions appear primarily driven by
own experiences.
Accordingly, a manager’s previous hiring experiences may affect their learning about
groups by affecting their subsequent hiring. We turn to an analysis of the persis-
tence of early experiences across multiple hiring events. The theoretical framework
predicts that the impact of negative experiences should be more persistent if they
lead to decreased hiring of a group, preserving potentially negatively-biased beliefs.
Moreover, the impact may be more persistent for minority groups because of stron-
ger belief updating, because it is easier for managers to avoid hiring from the group,
and because they observe less information about the group from sources outside
their own hiring. We estimate a similar regression model to equation (4.3), replacing
the measure of cumulative average experience with measures of experience with the
first group of black and white hires by a manager and the average of the first three
groups.
The results are shown in Table 4.3. Estimates from the first panel indicate a statis-
tically significant 1-2% decrease in black hiring for the current hiring event for a one
standard deviation increase in the fraction of the first black hire(s) that were fired
or quit within 3 months. Estimates from the second panel indicate a statistically
significant decrease of 3-4% in subsequent black hiring for a one standard deviation
increase in our measure of bad experience with the first three groups of black hires
by a manager.15 Column 4 includes hiring spells from more experienced managers
which hired workers before the start of our sample, with the smaller coefficients
suggesting that negative experiences at the beginning of a manager’s career, rather
than at the beginning of their current hiring spell, are particularly impactful. In
contrast, impacts of early negative experiences with white worker(s) are smaller and
the department manager, as well as worker integrity, illegal or unethical behavior, or violation of
rules and policies.
15Employers who hired fewer than three groups of black or white workers at the time of hiring
event e are excluded.
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statistically non-significant. Panels 4 and 5 also show smaller and generally statisti-
cally non-significant impacts for early positive experiences with both black and white
workers, highlighting a different persistence pattern from early negative experiences
with black workers in particular.
These results suggest that the subset of managers who hire black workers may have
had roughly unbiased priors about their performance on average. If they systemati-
cally underestimated the group’s mean performance, then negative experiences may
have had a muted impact on subsequent hiring and positive experiences may have
lead to persistent increases in hiring.
Lastly, we investigate how managers’ most recent experiences affect their hiring,
since they could be particularly salient due to recency bias or evolving hiring con-
texts and applicants pools. The third panel of Figure 4.3 indicates a statistically
significant decrease of around 5% in current hiring of black workers for a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the fraction of the latest black worker(s) hired by the
manager that quit or were fired within 3 months. Estimates of the impact of the
latest experience with white workers are approximately 30% smaller, but also statis-
tically significant. Panel 6 presents results for positive experiences corresponding to
a 2% increase (1.5% decrease) in black hiring for a one standard deviation increase
in our positive experience measure for the latest black (white) hire(s). These results
indicate that recent experiences with both worker groups are salient, including for
more experienced managers as shown in column (4).
4.4.1 Interpretation and Alternative Explanations
Overall, our results broadly support the predictions of our theoretical framework.
First, cumulative previous experiences of managers with worker groups impact cur-
rent hiring of these groups in the predicted direction. Second, early negative expe-
riences, particularly with black workers, have more persistent impacts than positive
ones. Third, managers react more following hiring experiences with black workers.
As such, minority workers are disproportionately impacted, because of differential
updating by managers combined with the relative persistence of negative experiences
on subsequent hiring for these workers.
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Managers learning about the performance of worker groups from their experience
is one natural explanation for these findings. Persistence in hiring patterns across
groups could also be driven by supply-side adjustments, such as workers selectively
applying for positions with managers based on their hiring record. These provide a
poor alternative explanation: workers apply for a job at the store or area level, do
not know their manager until the interview, and are unlikely to observe information
about the manager’s hiring record until they are employed.16 Employment through
referrals with racially-homogeneous networks also provides a poor alternative expla-
nation. First, we document larger hiring responses following experiences with black
workers although evidence suggests that proportionally more white workers are hi-
red through referrals (Kirnan et al., 1989; Taber and Hendricks, 2003). Second, for
referrals to be effective, managers should hire workers referred by high-performing
workers, inconsistent with decreases in black hiring following negative experiences
being driven by foregone referrals. Third, positive experiences as measured do not
reflect a direct change in worker group composition, but do affect subsequent hiring.
Fourth, our results along with institutional details suggest that workers are not as-
signed to department managers based on their performance with groups, especially
since we exclude transfers.17
Selection on unobservables and taste-based discrimination (including by co-workers),
such that negative (positive) experiences reflect a bad (good) working climate for
minority workers which translates to less (more) hiring, are also poor alternative
explanations. To the extent that work climate and taste-based discrimination are
relatively time invariant, they are captured by store and manager fixed effects. Furt-
her, it seems unlikely that negative experiences with white workers reflect prejudice
or a bad working climate for white workers in predominantly white departments
with white managers. Yet, we find that experiences with white workers do impact
black hiring, and vice versa. Lastly, such alternatives provide little rationale for the
persistence of negative experiences in particular.
16Managers may treat workers differently during the hiring process in a way that makes black
workers less likely to receive an offer or accept it, but that is broadly consistent with our mechanism:
negative experiences create biases which shape views and behavior in a self-sustaining way.
17Similarly, we find little evidence that a higher fraction of black workers in a manager’s current
team leads to more black hires in the future regardless of experiences and after controlling for store
and manager fixed effects, conflicting with worker-group complementarities being an alternative
explanation. These would also not explain why experiences with black workers have larger, more
persistent impacts on hiring.
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Managers learning about their own ability rather than worker groups is also unlikely
to be driving our results, and whether some managers are indeed better or worse
at hiring certain groups is inconsequential. Appendix C suggests that inheriting
worse black workers decreases subsequent black hiring, though precision is low, and
experiences with black workers who were fired or quit for reasons unlikely to be
related to the manager’s performance also decrease subsequent black hiring. There
is also extensive evidence in psychology and economics that managers, employers,
and CEOs are routinely overconfident and attribute negative outcomes to external
sources (Moore et al., 2015; Guenzel and Malmendier, 2020).
The explanation which best rationalizes our results is that of employers learning
about groups through their own hiring experiences with these groups. This learning
could be quite broad, potentially including subjective productivity components and
match quality, and could affect subsequent treatment of these workers by managers
in several ways. Still, the key takeaway is that managers aim to repeat experiences
perceived as successful and avoid those perceived as unsuccessful. When they attri-
bute some of the discrepancy between a worker’s expected and realized productivity
to potential differences between worker groups, then our theoretical framework pre-
dicts the creation and persistence of biased beliefs which generate the patterns in
hiring that we document.
4.5 Conclusion
We study the determinants of individual manager heterogeneity in the hiring of racial
worker groups using the employment records of a large US retailer and studying
repeated hiring decisions of managers. We find that the hiring context, such as
the location of a store, is an important determinant of the hiring of black workers
across managers, but so are manager fixed effects and previous hiring experiences
of the manager with these workers. Consistent with a theoretical framework which
combines statistical discrimination with learning about worker groups, we find that
1) negative (positive) experiences with black and white workers decrease (increase)
subsequent relative hiring of these groups, 2) the impact of experiences with black
workers on subsequent hiring is disproportionately large, and 3) negative experiences
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with black workers lead to particularly persistent decreases in subsequent hiring of
the group.
Our results have a number of implications for the literature, including for the study
of discrimination and the organization of the firm. We contribute to a growing body
of work on managers, particularly in decentralized organizations, having discretion
in hiring which leaves room for individual biases (Hoffman et al., 2018; Berson et
al., 2019; Benson et al., 2020; Bergman et al., 2020). Since inefficient hiring is cos-
tly for the firm, this suggests scope for the design of organizational policies. Some
options include pre-employment testing and the use of hiring algorithms, but the
firm we study already has pre-employment testing and the patterns we document
can arise even if managers are profit-maximizers and Bayesian over their own expe-
riences. More targeted information aggregation and sharing between managers may
be necessary.
More fundamentally, the firm we study is an important employer, yet the firm’s
organization and the labor market in general appear to provide little corrective in-
formation to managers with individual idiosyncrasies in their hiring of minorities
fueled by their personal experiences. We present the first evidence of hiring discrimi-
nation attributable to endogenous employer learning about worker groups creating
persistent biased beliefs across employers in a broadly representative labor market
setting. Such biased beliefs appear unlikely to resolve themselves through normal
market interactions and at a minimum may amount to several years of worse em-
ployment opportunities and lower lifetime earnings for minority workers. Classical
models of labor market discrimination are generally inadequate to capture discrimi-
natory behavior arising from incorrect group perceptions, suggesting the importance
of developing theories and gathering evidence on this more nuanced type of discri-
mination.
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Figure 4.2: Manager Predicted Shares of Black Hiring Based on Hiring Context,












Predicted shares are obtained by averaging predicted values for each manager from an individual
hire level linear probability model regression including whether the worker was hired for a part-time
or full-time job, the manager’s previous number of hires at the time that the current worker is hired,
yearly state unemployment rate and fraction with at least some college education, and month and
year, store, job title, and individual manager fixed effects.
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Manager Fixed Effects, >5 Hires
See Figure 4.2 for specification details. Fixed effects are estimated for the largest connected sample
of stores and managers following Abowd et al. (1999) and adjusted using empirical Bayes shrinkage.
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N. Obs 1,067,682 27,470
Performance Measures Black White
Fired within 3 months 0.768 0.044
(0.266) (0.205)
Quit within 3 months 0.188 0.198
(0.391) (0.399)
Tenure above 1 year 0.089 0.108
(0.284) (0.311)
Performance measures are calculated at the in-
dividual hire level. Tenure corresponds to tenure
in the position for which the worker was hired.
The absence of a worker quitting or being fired
within one year does not imply that the worker
has achieved a year of tenure, given transfers and
layoffs.
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Table 4.2: Cumulative Impact of Previous Experiences with Black and White Wor-




Black 0.048 0.050 0.041 0.044 0.060
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.008)
White -0.009 0.023 -0.001 -0.012
(0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.007)
Outcome Mean 0.380 0.380 0.439 0.326 0.365
Observations 35,937 35,937 22,312 22,510 72,424
P-Value: Black = -1 * White 0.023 0.004 0.053 0.000
Fraction Quit or Fired
Black -0.073 -0.072 -0.057 -0.059 -0.067
(0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) (0.011)
White 0.044 0.031 0.017 0.067
(0.022) (0.027) (0.025) (0.016)
Outcome Mean 0.367 0.348 0.403 0.307 0.337
Observations 33,971 31,911 19,546 23,741 66,692
P-Value: Black = -1 * White 0.077 0.310 0.060 0.169
Fraction Long Tenure
Black 0.062 0.058 0.072 0.043 0.062
(0.023) (0.024) (0.031) (0.028) (0.016)
White -0.001 -0.047 0.012 -0.015
(0.027) (0.038) (0.030) (0.018)
Outcome Mean 0.366 0.347 0.402 0.306 0.336
Observations 28,456 26,655 16,198 19,869 56,911
P-Value: Black = -1 * White 0.090 0.522 0.155 0.025
Expected Tenure corresponds to the cumulative average deviation from expected
tenure at the firm for workers hired by the manager. Regressions include the fraction
of full-time and female hires, average age of hires, total number of workers hired in
the event, number of previous hiring events, time since the last hiring event, yearly
unemployment and college attainment rates in the state, month and year, store, and
manager fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the manager level are presented
in parentheses. Column 3 restricts the sample to female hires, column 4 restricts the
sample to white managers, column 5 includes managers who were hiring at the firm
before the start of our sample.
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Table 4.3: Persistence of Previous Experiences with Black and White Workers on
Current Hiring of Black Workers
Female Workers White Managers All Spells
Fraction Quit or Fired
First Event
Black -0.019 -0.024 -0.016 -0.007
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004)
White -0.009 -0.015 -0.013 0.000
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005)
Outcome Mean 0.367 0.418 0.328 0.354
Observations 35,613 22,013 26,404 72,880
P-Value: Black = -1 * White 0.006 0.005 0.023 0.198
Average of Events 1-3
Black -0.042 -0.060 -0.033 -0.024
(0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.009)
White -0.013 -0.046 -0.023 -0.008
(0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.011)
Outcome Mean 0.402 0.449 0.337 0.385
Observations 27,829 17,417 22,177 59,762
P-Value: Black = -1 * White 0.005 0.000 0.030 0.010
Previous Event
Black -0.041 -0.043 -0.039 -0.043
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
White 0.035 0.029 0.032 0.036
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Outcome Mean 0.348 0.403 0.307 0.337
Observations 31,911 19,546 23,741 66,692
P-Value: Black = -1 * White 0.174 0.1297 0.168 0.020
Fraction Long Tenure
First Event
Black -0.010 0.013 0.009 -0.012
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006)
White -0.003 0.005 0.011 0.002
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006)
Outcome Mean 0.366 0.4170849 0.328 0.353
Observations 29,869 18,324 22,220 62,487
P-Value: Black = -1 * White 0.375 0.3559 0.268 0.271
Average of Events 1-3
Black 0.020 0.057 0.013 0.006
(0.018) (0.030) (0.026) (0.012)
White 0.018 -0.013 0.012 0.002
(0.020) (0.029) (0.028) (0.012)
Outcome Mean 0.401 0.446 0.364 0.385
Observations 23,527 14,736 17,268 51,696
P-Value: Black = -1 * White 0.146 0.298 0.489 0.645
Previous Event
Black 0.022 0.026 0.021 0.019
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006)
White -0.016 -0.021 -0.013 -0.006
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005)
Outcome Mean 0.347 0.402 0.306 0.336
Observations 27,249 16,198 19,869 58,026
P-Value: Black = -1 * White 0.658 0.7575 0.558 0.080
Clustered standard errors at the manager level are presented in parentheses. First Event
refers to the first group of workers from a given race hired by the manager, Average of Events
1-3 refers to the average outcome of the first three groups (excluding managers who hired less
than three groups of workers from either racial group). Latest Event refers to the latest group




This dissertation presents a new theory of discrimination in the labor market based
on employers developing biased beliefs about the productivity of worker groups.
Chapter II presents a statistical discrimination model in which employers are initially
uncertain about the productivity of worker groups, perceive group membership as
a potentially relevant indicator of individual productivity, and endogenously learn
about group productivity through their own hiring. In a dynamic setting, employers
have noisier initial information on one group’s productivity relative to another and
trade off learning about that group against current-period profit maximization. An
employer’s hiring history shapes their future hiring and learning. Positive experiences
create positive biases, which endogenously correct themselves through more hiring
and learning. Negative experiences, however, create negative biases which decrease
hiring and learning. Differential learning across employers results in a negatively-
skewed distribution of beliefs about the group’s productivity which can cause the
wage of the group about whose productivity employers have noisier initial informa-
tion to fall and remain below their expected productivity in the long run. The model
generates steady state predictions analogous to taste-based discrimination, with en-
dogenous beliefs replacing preferences, providing a new way to understand prejudice
as the result of life experiences shaping beliefs in distortionary ways.
In Chapter III, I create a controlled environment to study how biased beliefs arise
through endogenous employer learning about groups. Workers perform the real-
effort task of solving character puzzles on the computer, which corresponds to their
productivity in the context of the experiment. Employers then repeatedly hire wor-
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kers, choosing between one of the two groups each period and observing their hire’s
productivity. They are incentivized to hire the most productive workers available,
requiring them to identify which group is more productive, if any. I study how ne-
gative biases about group productivity arise from an employer’s hiring history. I
give employers better initial information on the productivity of one group and fo-
cus on hiring and learning about the other group. Consistent with the theory, the
results show that negative hiring experiences, captured through the hiring of relati-
vely low productivity workers, lead to persistent negatively-biased beliefs about the
group’s productivity, specifically by decreasing subsequent hiring of the group and
therefore learning. In contrast, positive experiences increase subsequent hiring and
learning, mitigating positive biases. Across employers, differential hiring and lear-
ning generate a persistent negatively-skewed distribution of beliefs about the group’s
productivity.
In Chapter IV, I use administrative data from the U.S. operations of a large national
retailer to examine how managers’ past experience hiring black and white workers
affects the race of their subsequent hires. We document three specific hiring patterns
that are particularly consistent with endogenous employer learning about worker
group productivity. First, positive past experiences with white or black workers in-
crease a manager’s propensity to hire from that group, whereas negative experiences
decrease their propensity. Second, learning is asymmetric by race. Although past
experience affects subsequent hiring for both black and white workers, the effect is
particularly pronounced for black workers. Third, early negative hiring experiences
lead to a substantial persistent decline in black hiring, while the effects of early ex-
periences with white workers or early positive experiences with black workers are





Appendix for Chapter II
A.1 Proofs of Propositions 1-3
Proposition 1
By market clearing, the marginal employer is indifferent between hiring from either
group, implying λmt = wBt(Ψt) − wA. Define λmt = λct . Given current beliefs and
wages, profit maximization implies that employers with λjt > λ
c
t strictly prefer to
hire from group B while those with λjt < λ
c
t strictly prefer to hire from group A.
Thus, λct represents the cutoff relative WTP for a group B worker in period t.
Proposition 2
Given the prior µB ∼ N(µ0, 1/τ0) and i.i.d hiring signals x1, ..., xK drawn from X ∼
N(µ, 1/τ), the Bayesian Central Limit Theorem implies under standard regulatory
conditions that the posterior belief distribution converges in distribution to µ as
K → ∞. The posterior distribution of beliefs for employers who remain above the
hiring cutoff in the long run converges in distribution to µ. For almost all of these
these employers, this implies that the value of learning converges to 0 such that
λjt → 0 as K → ∞. Market clearing requires that a subset of employers hire from
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group B, for almost all of whom λjt → 0 as K →∞ and λjt ≥ wBt(Ψt)−wA. Thus,
wA ≥ wBt(Ψt) asymptotically.
Market clearing also requires that a subset of employers hire from group A asymp-
totically, implying λjt ≤ λCt for those employers. Define
∆Vjt = Et[V (ψ
′
Sjt+1
, wBt+1(Ψt+1))]− Et[V (ψSjt+1 , wBt+1(Ψt+1))] and
∆fjt = µ− E[µB|Sjt].
Employer j hires from group A only if β∆Vjt − ∆fjt ≤ wBt(Ψt) − wA. Since the
value of information ∆Vjt is weakly positive, then ∆fjt > 0 for this group. ∆fjt >
0 implies that E[µB|Sjt] < µ. Employers who hire from group A asymptotically
must have negatively-biased beliefs. Let FB denote the fraction of group B workers.
Asymptotically, since unbiased employers hire from B and biased employers from A,
the fraction of biased employers is equal to 1− FB by market clearing.
Proposition 3
First, I show that wBt is strictly decreasing in t. Define EBt as the subset of employers
who hire from group B in a given period t, with the fraction of employers in EBt
equaling FB. By definition, λjt ≥ wBt −wA for these employers. Given a continuum
of employers, some employers arbitrarily close to the cutoff observe a low signal, such
that there exists eBt+1 ⊂ EBt with λjt+1 < wBt − wA ≤ λjt.1 Suppose wBt+1 ≥ wB,
then EBt+1 ⊂ EBt and the labor market doesn’t clear. Thus, wBt+1 must be smaller
than wBt for all t.
Second, I show that wBt → c ∈ R as t→∞. Since wBt is strictly decreasing in t, this
is equivalent to establishing that wBt cannot fall below an arbitrarily low limit w. In
any period, even asymptotically, employers below the hiring cutoff have observed a
finite number of signals (if any). Then, they have a strictly positive value of learning
about group B and posterior mean beliefs strictly above negative infinity. Denote
λj = w > −∞ where λj is the supremum relative WTP for a group B worker for
1This does not rely on unbounded signals. The continuum assumption ensures that a mass of
employers is arbitrarily close to the cutoff each period.
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employers below the cutoff as t→∞. Then, wBt ≥ w for any t. Since wBt is strictly
decreasing in t but bounded below, it must converge to a constant as t→∞.
Third, I show that c < wA. For any ε > 0, there exists a t large enough such that
fraction FB − ε of employers currently hiring from Group B have value of learning
smaller than ε and will hire from Group B in the limit.2 There also exists t
′
> t
arbitrarily large such that beliefs of employers hiring from Group B at t
′
are almost
entirely driven by signals observed between t and t
′
. More precisely, µB|St′j follows
approximately the same distribution as µB|{St′j \ Sjt} with the same parameters.
Given that E[µB|{St′j \ Sjt}] converges to µ for almost all employers who hire from
group B, some employers who hire from group B at t
′
have posterior mean beliefs
below µ3 and a value of learning smaller than ε, such that their relative WTP for
a group B worker λjt is below 0. By market clearing, the relative WTP of the
marginal employer is no greater than the infimum relative WTP of employers hiring
from group B, implying that λmt = wBt−wA < 0 and thus that wBt < wA for t > t
′
.
Since wBt is strictly decreasing in t, then c < wA.
A.2 Additional Model Implications
Signals of Individual Productivity
Consider the case in which employers observe a noisy signal si of individual worker
productivity xi at the hiring stage and do not rely solely on group membership g to
predict productivity. This signal is exogenous, rather than the result of an investment
choice, and can be thought of as a score on a pre-employment test. Employers
observe
si = xi + εi
2This is because the value of learning and the probability that an employer currently hiring from
group B falls below the cutoff next period go to 0 asymptotically.
3The probability that the posterior beliefs of employers all converge in distribution to µ from
above is 0 given a large number of employers and signals.
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where εi ∼ N(0, 1/τε) is i.i.d. random noise. They estimate productivity according
to the following rule
E[xi|si, Sjt] = γsi + (1− γ)E[µg|Sjt]
where γgjt =
1/τ+V ar[µg |Sjt]
1/τ+V ar[µg |Sjt]+1/τε is a measure of the signal’s precision. Negatively-
biased beliefs about the mean productivity of group B arise as in the baseline model.
Since employers above the hiring cutoff are willing to pay more for a group B worker
conditional on a given signal value, workers and employers sort such that hiring and
learning dynamics are also unchanged. Workers can be indexed by their signal value,
with the same learning problem arising for each worker “type” and a market-clearing
wage for each type-group pair.
Discrimination may still vary by occupation, skill, and education depending on the
variance in productivity and productivity signals. These variances determine the
extent to which employers rely on group membership to predict productivity, and
therefore the importance of the learning problem. Discrimination empirically appears
smaller for high-skill workers, at least in the case of race (Lang and Lehmann, 2012).
Differences in the information available at the time of hiring, variance in productivity,
or the speed with which the market learns individual worker productivity, could
all help explain this empirical regularity (Arcidiacono et al., 2010; Lindqvist and
Vestman, 2011).
Endogenous Worker Investments
When groups are ex-ante equally productive, statistical discrimination models usu-
ally generate outcome disparities by showing that workers from group B may face
different incentives to invest in human capital, for example due to employers percei-
ving their signals of productivity as noisier (Lundberg and Startz, 1983) or because
they hold negative stereotypes against them (Coate and Loury, 1993). Statistical
discrimination therefore arises when group B becomes less productive due to lower
investment.
In my model, even if employers have biased beliefs on average, workers and employ-
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ers sort such that group B is hired by employers above the cutoff who have ap-
proximately unbiased average beliefs with experience. Accordingly, group B doesn’t
necessarily have incentives to invest differentially in human capital due to biased
beliefs of employers. Nevertheless, group B may expect a different return for the
same investment if relative wages across investment levels vary due to the nature of
individual signals of productivity. Group B workers may be incentivized to sort into
areas or occupations where the information asymmetry problem faced by employers
is lesser, providing a rationale for group specialization. Similarly, if group B earns
lower returns from the labor market overall, they may have incentives to invest less
in human capital which could exacerbate discrimination.
Firm Size
Employers who hire more workers have a higher value of learning and may learn
more quickly. Negative biases may be less likely to arise and persist, and these
employers may hire a higher fraction of group B workers, consistent with evidence
reported in Holzer (1998) and Miller (2017) for black workers. These implications
presumably relate to large establishments with centralized, professional human re-
sources (HR) departments rather than large firms with decentralized hiring across
smaller establishments.4
Implications for market-level discrimination are limited if each establishment hires a
negligible fraction of workers and there is size heterogeneity above the hiring cutoff.
Unless all of group B is hired by large establishments with centralized hiring, these
establishments are not marginal, by definition, and the wage is determined by smaller
establishments. Casual empiricism certainly suggests that some small firms and large
firms with decentralized hiring hire workers from groups typically of interest in the
discrimination literature. A back of the envelope calculation suggests that around
17% of black workers were employed at firms with less than 25 workers in 1998, and
this proportion is substantially larger for establishments under 25 workers.5
4Evidence from hiring at decentralized firms suggests that individual managers play an important
role in the racial composition of hires (Giuliano et al., 2009; Giuliano and Ransom, 2013; Benson,
Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2019).
5This is based on Headd (2000) which provides the proportion of black workers across firm size
in 1998 combined with statistics from the Census Bureau on the total number of workers employed
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Search Frictions
A formal search model is beyond the scope of this paper, but previous work suggests
that search frictions may have important implications. With random search, the
intuition behind the endogenous learning mechanism is vastly unchanged. Employers
who hire from group B and have negative (positive) experiences are less (more) likely
to select a worker from the group again in the future. Positive biases are learned away
more quickly than negative ones, so the distribution of beliefs is negatively skewed.
The wage gap would be determined by the average rather than the marginal employer,
as highlighted by Black (1995) in reference to the Becker model. Accordingly, wage
gaps along the equilibrium path may be larger in a search framework. Search frictions
could also mitigate the stark prediction that employers below the hiring cutoff in the
long run never hire from group B again.
Minority Employers
The role of group B employers depends on whether they share the beliefs of group
A employers or face the opposite learning problem (know group B productivity and
learn about group A). In the first case, the distinction between employer groups is
irrelevant for my purpose. In the second case, these employers constitute a fraction
of the market who may not develop biases about group B, encouraging segregation
and mitigating wage gaps. Other factors may disadvantage group B employers:
uncertainty about the majority group or discrimination in promotion and the capital
market (Farrell et al., 2020). Empirical evidence for both race and gender suggests
that the proportion of managers is low compared to that of workers (Giuliano et al.,
2009; Blau and Kahn, 2017).
A.3 Simulations and Comparative Dynamics
Given a prior distribution of beliefs, the initial market-clearing wage when employers
maximize their expected profits is found. Beliefs are updated such that those above
at firms below 25 workers and the total number of black workers for the same year.
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the cutoff receive a signal of productivity from group B and others retain their beliefs.
Given this new distribution of beliefs, a new market-clearing wage is found, and the
process is repeated. The dynamic optimization problem is solved for a discretized
state space which gives the value of learning for combinations of beliefs and wages
through interpolation. Worker productivity is distributed N(0, 2) and prior beliefs
are distributed N(0, 1). The group A wage wA is normalized to 0 and the discount
factor β is set to 0.9.
The expected size of the wage gap is influenced by the exogenous parameters of
the model as in Figure A.1. Namely, as in the Becker model, a higher fraction
of group B workers is predicted to lead to a lower wage for group B. A lower
mean group productivity also leads to a lower wage. If employers have negatively-
biased priors about group B productivity, then their wage will be lower initially and
reach a similar level in the long run. A higher prior precision or lower variance in
productivity increases the wage of group B. Assuming homogeneous rather than
unbiased priors has little impact on the wage (slightly higher), while introducing
stereotype bias through employers overestimating the precision of their signals (or
equivalently underestimating the variance in group B’s productivity) decreases the
wage. With entry and exit of employers, when new employers hold unbiased priors,
a lower exit rate differential for employers who hire from group A leads to a lower
wage for group B, as does a lower aggregate exit rate.
In Figure A.2, I conduct simulations with entry and exit of employers in which
employers below the cutoff are 100% more likely to exit in any given period and new
employers enter the market with biased priors. Namely, mean prior beliefs equal
the average belief of employers already in the market. A wage gap is sustained and
larger than when employers have unbiased priors as in Figure A.2, even with a higher
differential exit rate.
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Figure A.1: Wage Gap and Model Parameters
Equal Group Size Homogenous Priors
Negatively−Biased Priors Low Prior Precision
High Signal Precision Stereotype Bias
Lower Mean Productivity Lower Exit Differential
Lower Aggregate Exit
Baseline
Equal Group Size refers to group B being of equal size to group A (50% of workers). Homogenous Priors refers to
each employer holding prior µ0 = 0. Negatively-Biased Priors refers to employers having mean prior beliefs below the
true value (-1 vs 0). Low Prior Precision corresponds to a case with prior variance equal to 2. High Signal Precision
corresponds to a case with variance in worker productivity equal to 1. Stereotype bias corresponds to a case where
employers incorrectly believe group B worker productivity to be 2 when it is 4. Lower Mean Productivity corresponds
to a case where mean group B productivity is lower than that of group A (-1 vs 0). Lower Exit Differential refers to
a case where employers who hire from group A are 10% more likely to exit the market each period. Lower Aggregate
Exit refers to a case where the overall exit rate is 1% each period. See Figure A.1 for other parameter choices.
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Marginal (p75) Wage Gap
Marginal Beliefs and the Wage Gap
The aggregate exit rate corresponds to 2% each period, with a 100% higher exit rate for employers below the hiring
cutoff for group B. New entrants have mean beliefs equal to the mean of employers already in the market. See Figure
A.1 for other parameter choices.
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A.4 General Productivity Distribution
Let worker productivity be drawn from X|µB ∼ G(x), a one-parameter family of
distributions characterized by their mean, with full support on an interval of real
numbers X, bounded variance, and density function g(x). The parameter of interest
is the expected productivity of group B, µB = EG[x]. Employers have a common
prior distribution about group B’s mean productivity h(µB). Each hire provides an
i.i.d. private signal x about worker productivity and Sjt is the collection of all signals
observed by time t. Under strictly monotone and continuous Bayesian updating on





The hiring decision hinges on the expected productivity of Group B, which decre-
ases with lower signals about the group’s productivity. As such, hiring decisions,
market clearing conditions and wage setting are unchanged, along with Proposition
1. Proposition 2 follows under regularity conditions on G(·) and h(·). Proposition 3
follows from assumptions made on G(·) as well as Propositions 1-2.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix for Chapter III
B.1 Example Puzzle
Figure B.1: Example Puzzle
The square with characters on the right differs from the square on the





Page 1. There are two roles in this study: workers and employers. You will play
the role of the worker. Your task is to solve as many character puzzles as possible
within a 4:00 minute period. You will be able to solve a practice puzzle on the next
page to familiarize yourself with the task. For each puzzle that you solve during the
four minutes, you will receive 250 credits. For example, if you solve 10 puzzles you
will receive 250 x 10 = 2500 credits.
Your performance on the task will be recorded and added to a pool of workforce
available to employers. Employers will be tasked with selecting the best workers
from the pool. When solving puzzles, you can only continue to the next page once
you enter the correct answer.
Before payment, your performance may be evaluated. If the study was not com-
pleted with reasonable effort, such as if no puzzles were solved, no payment will be
made.
Page 2. On this page, you have the opportunity to solve an example puzzle to
familiarize yourself with your task. The square with characters on the right differs
from the square on the left in two letters. You have to find those letters and enter
them in the submission box to solve the puzzle. For your submission to be valid,
you must enter the two letters from the square on the RIGHT without spaces in the
order in which they appear going row by row and then from left to right.
In this case, the fourth letter of the first row is “e” in the box on the right but “a”
in the box on the left and the fourth letter of the third row is “l” in the box on the
right but “c” in the box on the left. Accordingly, the correct answer is “el”. Note
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that entering “le” will not count as a correct answer. You can submit answers by
pressing the enter key or clicking on the ”next” button.
Page 3. On the next page, you are asked to solve a timed practice puzzle. Your
time will be recorded and may be visible to employers who will later be tasked with
selecting workers.
Only go to the next page when you are ready. The practice puzzle will start imme-
diately.
Page 4. Solve the puzzle below:
Reminder: the square with characters on the right differs from the square on the left
in two letters. You have to find those letters and enter them in the submission box
to solve the puzzle. For your submission to be valid, you must enter the two letters
from the square on the RIGHT without spaces in the order in which they appear
going row by row and then from left to right.
Page 5. Only go to the next page when you are ready. Your task will begin
immediately and you will have 4 minutes to solve as many puzzles as you can.
Instructor note: the next pages consist of one puzzle to solve per page, which is
replaced by a new puzzle when solved, until a four minute timer expires.
Page 6. Please complete the following short survey.
What is your age?





Which would you say more closely describes your racial or ethnic background?
White
Black




What is the highest degree or level of schooling you have completed? If currently
enrolled, highest degree received.
In which US state do you reside?
In which city do you reside?
Are you currently employed outside of Mechanical Turk? If so, what is your job?
For how many months have you been working on Mechanical Turk?
Please list your three favorite hobbies:
Page 7. You have earned ‘puzzle payment’ and your total earnings including your
bonus equal ‘earnings’.
Please press next to finish the study.
B.2.2 Employer Treatment B
Page 1. There are two roles in this study: workers and employers. You will play
the role of the employer. Participants assigned to be workers were previously tasked
with solving as many computer puzzles as they could in a 4 minute period and their
performance was recorded. They were paid 250 credits for each puzzle solved.
As an employer, your task is to identify and select the workers who have solved the
most puzzles from the pool of available workers over 15 periods of play. In each
100
period, you will select one worker and learn how many puzzles they solved. Each
worker is employed for only one period. Below, you are shown an example of a
puzzle similar to those solved by workers. The square with characters on the right
differs from the left in two letters. Workers had to identify those letters to solve the
puzzle.
Page 2. You are given the following information about workers. There are 200
workers in total from two distinct groups, group Orange and group Gray. Group
Orange is composed of 75% of all workers (150 workers) while group Gray is composed
of 25% of all workers (50 workers). When you select a worker from the Orange group,
you will automatically be given the group average of 9 puzzles solved. No initial
information is given on how many puzzles Gray workers solved on average, but you
can learn about the group by hiring workers from it.
When you select a worker, the number of puzzles they solved will be revealed to you
and you will receive 220 credits for each puzzle that they were able to solve. For
example, whenever you hire from group Orange, the number of puzzles will be 9 and
you will earn 9 x 220 = 1980 credits. You will be paid based on credits earned in
5 of the 15 periods of play, which will be randomly selected by the computer at the
end of the study. In every period, maximizing expected earnings therefore requires
selecting workers from the group which can solve more puzzles.
Page 3. Before you begin selecting workers and after every period in which you
hire a Gray worker, you will be asked what you believe the average number of puzzles
solved by Gray workers was given the information available to you. If you hire from
group Orange in a given period, your prediction about group Gray will carry over
from the last time you had to predict the number of puzzles they solved.
You will receive a small number of extra credits for having more accurate predictions
in two periods. These two periods will be selected randomly by the computer at the
end of the study.
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A procedure was designed to ensure that it is always in your interest to give your
best prediction of the average number of puzzles solved by group Gray. The details
are as follows. When you make your prediction, the difference between the true
productivity of the group and your prediction is calculated and then squared. This
number constitutes your prediction error and is compared to a random number (not
shown) drawn between 0 and 81 where each number has an equal probability of being
drawn.
If that random number is greater or equal to your prediction error and the period was
selected for payment, you will receive 110 extra credits for the period. Otherwise,
you will receive 0 extra credits.
You will be shown a few examples on the next page to familiarize yourself with the
procedure.
Page 4. Here are a few examples of how your prediction earnings are determi-
ned.
Suppose that workers from group Gray were able to solve 7 puzzles on average and
that the random number drawn for the period was 4.
If your prediction is 8, the difference between your prediction and the true average is
8 - 7 = 1. Your prediction error is 1x1 = 1. Since 1 is no greater than 4, you receive
110 credits.
Suppose instead that workers from group Gray were able to solve 10 puzzles on
average and that the random number drawn for the period was 8.
If your prediction is 8, the difference between your prediction and the true average
is 8 - 10 = -2. Your prediction error is -2x-2 = 4. Since 4 is no greater than 8, you
receive 110 credits.
If your prediction is 13, the difference between your prediction and the true average
is 13 - 10 = 3. Your prediction error is 3x3 = 9. Since 9 is greater than 8, you receive
0 credits.
As such, making a prediction which is closer to the truth increases your chance of
receiving extra credits.
Page 5. Here are two last important points you should keep in mind. Credits from
hiring a worker who solved one more puzzle in a single period (220 per puzzle) are
equal to the total extra credits which you can earn from making better predictions
about group Gray (220 in total) over all periods. As such, maximizing expected
credits requires hiring workers who solved more puzzles.
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Similarly, since the majority of your earnings will be based on your hiring perfor-
mance rather than participation, maximizing payment also requires maximizing the
number of puzzles solved by your employees.
Here is a summary of other key points.
Over 15 periods, you will select one worker per period from either group Gray or
group Orange and observe the number of puzzles they solved.
Group Orange has 150 workers, group Gray has 50 workers. On average, group
Orange workers solved 9 puzzles, which is the value that will be given to you if you
select from that group.
In five of these periods, you will be paid 220 credits for each puzzle that the workers
you select were able to solve. Before the first period and after every period in which
you hire a Gray worker, you will be asked about your best prediction of the average
number of puzzles solved by Gray workers.
In two periods, you will receive 110 extra credits if your current prediction is close
enough to the truth. On the next page, the instructions will be repeated in their
entirety for your reference.
Page 6. The entire instructions are repeated below for reference. Please review
them as needed. Throughout the study, you cannot return to previous pages once
you advance to a new page. To ensure that you understand the instructions be-
fore proceeding, some comprehension questions will be asked at the bottom of this
page.
Instructor note: the entire instructions were repeated here.
Please answer the following comprehension questions. If you make a mistake, please
refer to the instructions above. You will not be able to advance to the study until
you answer all questions correctly.
1. What is your role in this study? Enter 1 for “Employer” and 2 for “Worker”.
2. For how many periods will you hire workers?
3. Which group has the most workers? Enter 1 for “Gray”, 2 for “Orange”, 3 for
“Same” and 4 for “Unknown”.’
4. How many workers can you hire per period?
5. On average, how many puzzles did group Orange solve?
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6. You will receive credits for every puzzle solved by your workers. How many credits
will you receive per puzzle?
7. On average, did group Gray solve fewer or more puzzles than group Orange?
Enter 1 for “Fewer”, 2 for “Same”, 3 for “More” and 4 for “Unknown”.
8. How many credits in total can you earn from accurately predicting the average
number of puzzles solved by group Gray across all periods?
9. Suppose group Gray solved 10 puzzles on average and your prediction for the
average number of puzzles solved by the group is 12. Your prediction error is then
4. What is the smallest random number that can be drawn and still earn you
credits?
10. Which is worth the most credits overall, predicting the average number of puz-
zles solved by group Gray or hiring better workers from any group? Enter 1 for
“Predicting”, 2 for “Hiring”, 3 for “Same” and 4 for “Unknown”.
Page 7. Given the information available to you so far, report your best prediction
of the average number of puzzles solved by group Gray:
Page 8. Period 1 of 15.
Please choose the group from which you want to select a worker:
Page 9. Period 1 of 15.
The worker you have selected solved ‘no. puzzle’ puzzles and you have earned ‘no.
credit’ credits.
Instructor note: the following is only displayed if a worker from group Gray was
hired.
Given the information available to you so far, report your best prediction of the
average number of puzzles solved by group Gray:
Note that your last prediction was ‘prior’.
Instructor note: pages 8 and 9 are repeated for periods 2-15.
Page 10. Please imagine the following hypothetical scenario. There are two urns,
A and B, with balls of color red and black. Urn A has 50 Red balls and 50 Black
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balls. Urn B has an unknown number of Red and Black balls (with a total of 100
balls).
You will first select a color, Red or Black, and this will be your Success Color. One
ball would then be drawn from one of the urns.
Urn A pays 200 tokens if the ball is drawn from it and matches your Success Color,
and 0 tokens if it does not match. Since each color has a 1/2 chance of being drawn,
this means that drawing from Urn A pays 200 tokens with a chance of 1/2, and pays
0 with a chance of 1/2.
Urn B pays a positive amount if the ball drawn from it matches your Success Color,
and 0 tokens if it does not match. Since the chance of each color being drawn is
unknown, the chance of Urn B paying a positive number of tokens is unknown as
well.
The table below shows 20 cases which increase in the amount paid when a ball
matching your Success Color is drawn from Urn B. One of these cases will be selected
for payment at random. Your task is to choose at which case (number between 1
and 20) you want to “Switch” from drawing from Urn A to Urn B.
Making a choice to switch means that for every case before your choice, a ball would
be drawn from Urn A. For each case after your choice, including the case for which
you switch, a ball would be drawn from Urn B.
For example, if the case randomly selected is 9, case No. 9 would determine pay-
ment.
- If your “Switch” number is higher than 9, a ball would be drawn from Urn A, and
if the color of the ball matches the chosen Success Color, then you would earn 200
tokens. If it does not match, you would earn 0 tokens.
- If your “Switch” number is 9 or lower, a ball would be drawn from Urn B, and
if the color of the ball matches the chosen Success Color, then you would earn 228
tokens. If it does not match, you would earn 0 tokens.
Please make your choices by selecting from the drop-down lists below the table.
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Page 11. You have completed the main tasks of the study, thank you. A short
survey will now follow. Completion of this survey is also required for payment.
Page 12. Please complete the following short survey (1 of 3). The following ques-
tions relate to your beliefs about the groups and your selection decisions.
Do you believe group Gray solved fewer, the same, or more puzzles than group
Orange on average?
How important do you think intelligence is to explain the difference?
Very Important, Important, Somewhat Important, Unimportant, Very Unimpor-
tant
How important do you think effort is to explain this difference?
Very Important, Important, Somewhat Important, Unimportant, Very Unimpor-
tant
How important do you think experience or practice is to explain this difference?
Very Important, Important, Somewhat Important, Unimportant, Very Unimpor-
tant
Selecting from group Gray was riskier than selecting from group Orange.
Very Important, Important, Somewhat Important, Unimportant, Very Unimpor-
tant
Page 13. Please complete the following short survey (2 of 3). The following ques-
tions ask some information about yourself.
What is your age?












What is the highest degree or level of schooling you have completed? If currently
enrolled, highest degree received.
In which US state do you reside?
In which city do you reside?
Are you currently employed outside of Mechanical Turk? If so, what is your job?
Page 14. Please complete the following short survey (3 of 3). The following que-
stions ask about some of your views on race. Report the extent to which you agree
with the following statements: (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly
Disagree)
You oppose policies which give a preference in hiring and promotion to African-
Americans.
In general, African-Americans are as hard-working as whites.
In general, African-Americans are as competent at their job as whites.
In general, African-Americans are as intelligent as whites.
In general, African-Americans have as much schooling as whites.
There should be laws against marriages between African-Americans and whites.
If you are African-American, please consider the following questions as relating to
whites rather than African-Americans.
Are any members of your family or close friends African-American?
In general, you feel close to African-Americans. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral,
Disagree, Strongly Disagree)
You would object if a family member brought an African-American friend home for
dinner. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree)
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If an African-American with the same income and education as you have moved in
to your block, this would make a difference to you. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral,
Disagree, Strongly Disagree)
You object sending your children to a school with more than a few African-American
students. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree)
If your political party nominated an African-American for president, you would vote
for them if they were qualified for the job. (Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree,
Strongly Disagree)
Page 15. Thank you for participating.
You have earned ‘task payment’. Your total earnings including both your participa-
tion prize and bonus equal ‘earnings’.
Please press next to finish the study. You must press next to guarantee your pay-
ment.
B.2.3 Employer Treatment C (Only pages with differences
from Treatment B)
Page 2. You are given the following information about workers. There are 200
workers in total from two distinct groups, group Orange and group Gray. Group
Orange is composed of 75% of all workers (150 workers) while group Gray is composed
of 25% of all workers (50 workers).
In this study, you will focus on hiring from the group of 50 Gray workers. No initial
information is given on how many puzzles Gray workers solved on average, but you
can learn about the group by hiring workers from it. Those from group Orange were
able to solve 9 puzzles on average.
When you select a worker, the number of puzzles they solved will be revealed to you
and you will receive 180 credits for each puzzle that they were able to solve.
You will be paid based on credits earned in 5 of the 15 periods of play, which will be
randomly selected by the computer at the end of the study.
Page 3. Before you begin selecting workers and after every period, you will be
asked what you believe the average number of puzzles solved by Gray workers was
given the information available to you.
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You will receive a small number of extra credits for having more accurate predictions
in two periods. These two periods will be selected randomly by the computer at the
end of the study.
A procedure was designed to ensure that it is always in your interest to give your
best prediction of the average number of puzzles solved by workers. The details
are as follows. When you make your prediction, the difference between the true
productivity of the group and your prediction is calculated and then squared. This
number constitutes your prediction error and is compared to a random number (not
shown) drawn between 0 and 81 where each number has an equal probability of being
drawn.
If that random number is greater or equal to your prediction error and the period was
selected for payment, you will receive 110 extra credits for the period. Otherwise,
you will receive 0 extra credits.
You will be shown a few examples on the next page to familiarize yourself with the
procedure.
Page 4. Here are a few examples of how your prediction earnings are determi-
ned.
Suppose that workers were able to solve 7 puzzles on average and that the random
number drawn for the period was 4. If your prediction is 8, the difference between
your prediction and the true average is 8 - 7 = 1. Your prediction error is 1x1 = 1.
Since 1 is no greater than 4, you receive 110 credits.
Suppose instead that workers were able to solve 10 puzzles on average and that the
random number drawn for the period was 8.
If your prediction is 8, the difference between your prediction and the true average
is 8 - 10 = -2. Your prediction error is -2x-2 = 4. Since 4 is no greater than 8, you
receive 110 credits.
If your prediction is 13, the difference between your prediction and the true average
is 13 - 10 = 3. Your prediction error is 3x3 = 9. Since 9 is greater than 8, you receive
0 credits.
As such, making a prediction which is closer to the truth increases your chance of
receiving extra credits.
Page 5. Here are two last important points you should keep in mind: Credits from
hiring a worker who solved one more puzzle in a single period (180 per puzzle) are
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equal to the total extra credits which you can earn from making better predictions
over all periods (also 180).
Since the majority of your earnings will be based on your hiring performance rather
than participation, payment mostly depends on the number of puzzles solved by your
workers.
Here is a summary of other key points.
Over 15 periods, you will select one of the 50 Gray workers per period and observe
the number of puzzles they solved. In five of these periods, you will be paid 180
credits for each puzzle that the workers you select were able to solve. Before the first
period and after every period, you will be asked about your best prediction of the
average number of puzzles solved by Gray workers.
In two periods, you will receive 90 extra credits if your current prediction is close
enough to the truth.
On the next page, the instructions will be repeated in their entirety for your refe-
rence.
Page 6. The entire instructions are repeated below for reference. Please review
them as needed. Throughout the study, you cannot return to previous pages once
you advance to a new page. To ensure that you understand the instructions be-
fore proceeding, some comprehension questions will be asked at the bottom of this
page.
Instructor note: the entire instructions were repeated here.
Please answer the following comprehension questions. If you make a mistake, please
refer to the instructions above. You will not be able to advance to the study until
you answer all questions correctly.
1. What is your role in this study? Enter 1 for “Employer” and 2 for “Worker”.
2. For how many periods will you hire workers?
3. From which group of workers are you hiring? Enter 1 for “Orange” and 2 for
“Gray”.
4. How many workers can you hire per period?
5. You will receive credits for every puzzle solved by your workers. How many credits
will you receive per puzzle?
111
6. How many credits in total can you earn from accurately predicting the average
number of puzzles solved by workers across all periods?
7. Suppose workers solved 10 puzzles on average and your prediction for the average
number of puzzles is 12. Your prediction error is then 4. What is the smallest random
number that can be drawn and still earn you credits?
8. Which is worth the most credits overall, predicting the average number of puzzles
solved by workers or hiring better workers? Enter 1 for “Predicting”, 2 for “Hiring”,
3 for “Same” and 4 for “Unknown”.
9. How many workers are there in group Gray?
10. How many puzzles did workers from group Orange solve on average?
Page 7. Given the information available to you so far, report your best prediction
of the average number of puzzles solved by Gray workers:
Page 8. Period 1 of 15.
Please hire a worker by selecting below:
Page 9. Period 1 of 15.
The worker you have selected solved ‘no puzzle’ puzzles and you have earned ‘no
credit’ credits.
Given the information available to you so far, report your best prediction of the
average number of puzzles solved by Gray workers:
Note that your last prediction was ‘prior’.
Instructor note: pages 8 and 9 are repeated for periods 2-15.
Page 10. Please complete the following short survey.
What is your age?





Which would you say more closely describes your racial or ethnic background?
White
Black




What is the highest degree or level of schooling you have completed? If currently
enrolled, highest degree received.
In which US state do you reside?
In which city do you reside?
Are you currently employed outside of Mechanical Turk? If so, what is your job?
Page 11. Thank you for participating.
You have earned ‘task payment’. Your total earnings including both your participa-
tion prize and bonus equal ‘earnings’.
Please press next to finish the study. You must press next to guarantee your pay-
ment.
B.2.4 Employer Treatment B1 (Only pages with differences
from Treatment B)
Page 2. You are given the following information about workers. There are 100
workers in total from two distinct groups, group Gray and group Orange. There are
50 workers in each group.
When you select a worker from the Orange group, you will automatically be given
the group average of 9 puzzles solved.
No initial information is given on how many puzzles Gray workers solved on average,
but you can learn about the group by hiring workers from it.
113
When you select a worker, the number of puzzles they solved will be revealed to you
and you will receive 220 credits for each puzzle that they were able to solve. For
example, whenever you hire from group Orange, the number of puzzles will be 9 and
you will earn 9 x 220 = 1980 credits.
You will be paid based on credits earned in 5 of the 15 periods of play, which will
be randomly selected by the computer at the end of the study. In every period,
maximizing expected earnings therefore requires selecting workers from the group
which can solve more puzzles.
Page 5. Here are two last important points you should keep in mind. Credits from
hiring a worker who solved one more puzzle in a single period (220 per puzzle) are
equal to the total extra credits which you can earn from making better predictions
about group Gray (220 in total) over all periods. As such, maximizing expected
credits requires hiring workers who solved more puzzles.
Similarly, since the majority of your earnings will be based on your hiring perfor-
mance rather than participation, maximizing payment also requires maximizing the
number of puzzles solved by your employees.
Here is a summary of other key points.
Over 15 periods, you will select one worker per period from either group Gray or
group Orange and observe the number of puzzles they solved.
Both groups have 50 workers. On average, group Orange workers solved 9 puzzles,
which is the value that will be given to you if you select from that group.
In five of these periods, you will be paid 220 credits for each puzzle that the workers
you select were able to solve. Before the first period and after every period in which
you hire a Gray worker, you will be asked about your best prediction of the average
number of puzzles solved by Gray workers.
In two periods, you will receive 110 extra credits if your current prediction is close
enough to the truth.
On the next page, the instructions will be repeated in their entirety for your refe-
rence.
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B.2.5 Employer Treatment B2 (Only pages with differences
from Treatment B)
Page 3. The entire instructions are repeated below for reference. Please review
them as needed. Throughout the study, you cannot return to previous pages once
you advance to a new page. To ensure that you understand the instructions be-
fore proceeding, some comprehension questions will be asked at the bottom of this
page.
Instructor note: the entire instructions were repeated here.
Please answer the following comprehension questions. If you make a mistake, please
refer to the instructions above. You will not be able to advance to the study until
you answer all questions correctly.
1. What is your role in this study? Enter 1 for “Employer” and 2 for “Worker”.
2. For how many periods will you hire workers?
3. Which group has the most workers? Enter 1 for “Gray”, 2 for “Orange”, 3 for
“Same” and 4 for “Unknown”.
4. How many workers can you hire per period?
5. On average, how many puzzles did group Orange solve?
6. You will receive credits for every puzzle solved by your workers. How many credits
will you receive per puzzle?
7. On average, did group Gray solve fewer or more puzzles than group Orange?
Enter 1 for “Fewer”, 2 for “Same”, 3 for “More” and 4 for “Unknown”.
Page 4. Period 1 of 15.
Please choose the group from which you want to select a worker:
Page 5. Period 1 of 15.
The worker you have selected solved ‘no puzzle’ puzzles and you have earned ‘no
credit’ credits.
Instructor note: pages 4 and 5 are repeated for periods 2-15.
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Page 6. You will now be asked what you believe the average number of puzzles
solved by Gray workers was given the information available to you. You will receive
extra credits for a more accurate prediction.
A procedure was designed to ensure that it is always in your interest to give your
best prediction of the average number of puzzles solved by group Gray. The details
are as follows. When you make your prediction, the difference between the true
productivity of the group and your prediction is calculated and then squared. This
number constitutes your prediction error and is compared to a random number (not
shown) drawn between 0 and 81 where each number has an equal probability of being
drawn.
If that random number is greater or equal to your prediction error, you will receive
220 extra credits. Otherwise, you will receive 0 extra credits.
Here are a few examples of how your prediction earnings are determined.
Suppose that workers from group Gray were able to solve 7 puzzles on average and
that the random number drawn was 4. If your prediction is 8, the difference between
your prediction and the true average is 8 - 7 = 1. Your prediction error is 1x1 = 1.
Since 1 is no greater than 4, you receive 220 credits.
Suppose instead that workers from group Gray were able to solve 10 puzzles on
average and that the random number drawn was 8.
If your prediction is 8, the difference between your prediction and the true average
is 8 - 10 = -2. Your prediction error is -2x-2 = 4. Since 4 is no greater than 8, you
receive 220 credits.
If your prediction is 13, the difference between your prediction and the true average
is 13 - 10 = 3. Your prediction error is 3x3 = 9. Since 9 is greater than 8, you receive
0 credits.
As such, making a prediction which is closer to the truth increases your chance of
receiving extra credits. Please answer the following comprehension question. If you
make a mistake, please refer to the instructions above. You will not be able to
advance until you answer the question correctly.
Suppose group Gray solved 10 puzzles on average and your prediction for the average
number of puzzles solved by the group is 12. Your prediction error is then 4. What
is the smallest random number that can be drawn and still earn you credits?
Page 7. Given the information available to you so far, report your best prediction
of the average number of puzzles solved by group Gray:
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Instructor note: pages 8-11 correspond to Treatment B pages 12-15.
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APPENDIX C
Appendix for Chapter IV
C.1 Additional Information on Hiring Experien-
ces
Table C.1: Hiring Experiences and Worker Performance
Bad Experience Good Experience
Promotion 0 0.002
(0.045)
Sale Performance -0.138 -0.018
(0.572) (0.033)
Termination Reason
Job Abandonment 37.78 17.28
Probationary Period Termination 4.69 0.13
Unsatisfactory Performance 4.65 0.33
Career Advancement 2.66 9.60
Personal Reasons 10.30 18.66
Return to school 5.08 9.70
Sale performance is a normalized measure of sale performance relative to
targets established by the firm.
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C.2 More on Heterogeneity in Group Hiring Across
Managers
Figure C.1: Manager Predicted Shares of White Hiring Based on Hiring Context,










See Figure 4.2 for details.
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See Figures 4.2 and 4.3 for details.
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Figure C.3: Manager Predicted Shares of Black Hiring Based on Hiring Context,













See Figure 4.2 for details.
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C.3 Additional Results on the Impact of Hiring
Experiences
Table C.2: Robustness Checks and Heterogeneity Analyses
Fired Quit Relative to Relative to High Black Low Black ”Exogenous” ”Endowed” Store Avg. Exp.
White CBSA Population Population Separation Workers Change versus Others’
Cumulative Average
Fraction Quit or Fired
Black -0.087 -0.057 -0.068 -0.079 -0.091 -0.061 -0.063 -0.034 -0.067 -0.069
(0.027) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.032) (0.027) (0.045) (0.023)
White 0.112 0.025
(0.051) (0.024)





Outcome Mean 0.367 0.37 0.348 0.369 0.470 0.181 0.37 0.328 0.356 0.352
Observations 33,971 33,971 31,911 33,675 21,786 12,140 33,971 10,911 977 30,985
Fraction Long Tenure
Black 0.033 0.031 0.074 0.025 -0.006 0.010 0.057
(0.021) (0.024) (0.029) (0.034) (0.026) (0.074) (0.034)





Outcome Mean 0.37 0.37 0.47 0.18 0.33 0.35 0.35
Observations 28,456 28,456 18,354 10,074 9,360 790 25,916
Clustered standard errors at the manager level are presented in parentheses. High (Low) black population refer to the store being located in a CBSA
with above (below) median black population. Exogenous Separation restricts fires and quits to dissatisfaction with pay, compensation or benefits,
worker integrity, illegal or unethical behavior, or violation of rules and policies. Endowed Workers corresponds to workers already in the department
at the manager’s arrival. See Table 4.2 for additional details.
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C.4 Hispanic Workers
Table C.3: Cumulative Impact of Previous Experiences with Hispanic and White
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